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Friday, November 25

John Milledge, from the State of Georgia, attended.

Wednesday, November 30

The Embargo

Mr. Pickering. – Mr. President: I am aware, sir, of the consequences of advancing any thing from which conclusions may be drawn adverse to the opinions of our own Administration, which, by many, are conceived to be indisputably just. Merely to state these questions, and to mention such arguments as the British Government may, perhaps, have urged in their support on her side, is sufficient to subject a man to the popular charge of being under British influence, or to the vulgar slander of being a "British tory." He will be fortunate to escape the accusation of touching British gold. But, sir, none of these things move me. The patrons of the miscreants who utter these slanders know better, but are, nevertheless, willing to benefit by the impression they may make on the minds of the people. From an early period of my life I was zealously engaged in every measure opposed to the attempts of Great Britain to encroach upon our rights, until the commencement of our Revolutionary war; and during its whole continuance, I was uninterruptedly employed in important civil or military departments, contributing all my efforts to bring that war to a successful termination.

I, sir, am not the advocate of wrong-doers, to whatever country they belong, whether Emperors, or Kings, or the Administrators of a Republic. Justice is my object, and Truth my guide; and wherever she points the way I shall not fear to go.

Great Britain has done us many wrongs. When we were Colonies, she attempted to deprive us of some of our dearest birth-rights – rights derived from our English ancestors, rights which we defended, and finally established, by the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary war. But these wrongs, and all the wounds of war, were intended to be obliterated and healed by the treaty of peace, when all enmities should have ceased.

Great Britain wronged us in the capture and condemnation of our vessels under her orders of 1793, and she has made reparation for these wrongs, pursuant to a treaty, negotiated on practical principles by a statesman who, with liberal views and real candor, sought adjustment and reparation.

Monday, December 12

Enforcement of the Embargo Laws

Mr. Giles, from the committee appointed the 11th of November last, on that part of the Message of the President of the United States which relates to the embargo laws, and the measures necessary to enforce due observance thereof, made a further report, in part, of a bill to authorize and require the President of the United States to arm, man, and fit out for immediate service, all the public ships of war, vessels, and gunboats of the United States; and the bill was read, and passed to the second reading.

The bill is as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and required to cause to be fitted out, officered, manned, and employed, as soon as may be, all the frigates and other armed vessels of the United States, including gunboats; and to cause the frigates and armed vessels, so soon as they can be prepared for active service, respectively to be stationed at such ports and places on the seacoast as he may deem most expedient, or to cruise on any part of the coast of the United States, or territories thereof.

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That, for the purpose of carrying the foregoing provision into immediate effect, the President of the United States be, and is hereby, authorized and required, in addition to the number of petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, at present authorized by law, to appoint, and cause to be engaged and employed as soon as may be, – midshipmen, – corporals of marines, – able seamen, – ordinary seamen and boys, which shall be engaged to serve for a period not exceeding – years, but the President may discharge the same sooner, if in his judgment their services may be dispensed with; and to satisfy the necessary expenditures to be incurred therein, a sum not exceeding – dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, and shall be paid out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated."

Saturday, December 17

The credentials of Michael Leib, appointed a Senator by the State of Pennsylvania, were presented and read, and ordered to lie on file.

Enforcement of the Embargo

The Senate resumed the bill making further provision for enforcing the embargo.

Mr. Goodrich rose, and addressed the Senate as follows —

Mr. President: This bill, making further provision for enforcing the embargo, requires all our attention. We are not on ordinary business. An embargo for an indefinite period, over a great country like ours, abounding in rich staples and domestic products, and carrying on in its own vessels an extensive and profitable commerce, is a phenomenon in the civilized world. We are about entering on the second year of this novel measure, and even in defiance of the lessons which experience teaches, that without producing any beneficial results, it is embroiling the choicest interests of the nation. On foreign powers it has made no impression, and its ruinous effect on our own country, we see in the waste of private property and public revenue; in the discontents of our citizens; in the perplexed state of the public councils, and the increasing difficulties that are fast gathering round the Government. The friends of the embargo say, that it has been evaded and violated, but that when strictly enforced, it will compel foreign nations to respect our rights. Under these impressions, the system is to be maintained. To enforce it, the powers of the Government are to be put in array throughout our country, especially in places where discontents are manifested; and an extension is to be given to that system of arbitrary seizures of vessels, goods, merchandise, and domestic products, on suspicion of their being intended for exportation, which came in with the embargo laws, and has attended their execution.

In all this, sir, I see nothing that is to conciliate the conflicting opinions and passions of our citizens, and restore concord amongst them. I see nothing that will invigorate the public councils, and resuscitate the dormant spirit and resources of the nation. To me it seems that the Administration, without presenting to public view any definite object or course, are pressing forward our affairs into a chaos of inextricable difficulties. And I cannot but regard this bill as holding a prominent place among the measures leading on that unfortunate issue.

This bill bears marks of distrust entertained by the Government of the people, or a considerable portion of them, and of the State authorities; it places the coasting trade under further and vexatious restraints, as well as its general regulations under the control of the President. It intrenches on the municipal polity of the States, and the intercourse of the people in their ordinary business. And, what above all will wound the public sentiment, for the accustomed and mild means of executing the laws by civil process through the tribunals of justice, it substitutes military powers to be called out and exercised, not in aid, but in place, of the civil authorities.

The coasting trade is placed under the regulation of the President by this bill:

1st. Collectors may refuse permission to put a cargo on board of any ship, vessel, or boat, in any case where they have their own personal suspicions that it is intended for foreign exportation, and in every case which may be comprehended within the scope of any general instructions, issued by command of the President. But there is a proviso as to coasting vessels uniformly employed in the navigation of bays, sounds, rivers, and lakes, which shall have obtained a general permission.

2d. General permissions may be granted to the last-mentioned vessels, under such general instructions as the President of the United States may give, when it can be done without danger of the embargo being violated, to take on board such articles as may be designated in such general permission or permissions.

By these general instructions, the President may prescribe the kind and quantity of exports from, and imports into the individual States, and from and to the particular districts within a State. He may suspend them in part or in whole.

The power of issuing general instructions now proposed to be given to the President by law, he exercised in the recess of Congress, and in my opinion, without law. The Governor of Massachusetts was authorized to give certificates, or licenses for the importation of flour into that State; and, under general instructions from the President, without personal suspicion of his own, the collector at Charleston, in South Carolina, detained a vessel; which called forth the independent exercise of the judicial power of the circuit court in that State, to control the President's instructions. I am sensible the Administration and its friends have an arduous task in executing the embargo; difficulties beset them on every side; difficulties inherent in the measure itself, and not to be overcome by accumulating rigorous penalties, and an extension of the Executive power. The power to regulate commerce is vested in Congress, and by granting it to the President, do we not transfer to him one of the most important and delicate of the legislative powers? What State would have adopted the constitution, if it had been foreseen that this power would be granted to any man, however distinguished by office?

The sections I have considered, principally affect merchants and seafaring men in their business, at stores, custom-houses, about wharves, ships, and vessels. But other sections take a wider range, and intrench on the ordinary concerns of the great body of the people, by the powers they give for unreasonable and arbitrary searches for, and seizures of their property.

Collectors of the customs throughout the United States, by the tenth section, are empowered to take into custody specie, or any articles of domestic growth or manufacture, under these circumstances, when deposited in unusual places, in unusual quantities, in places where there is reason to believe they are intended for exportation in vessels, sleighs, or other carriages, or in any manner apparently on their way towards the territories of foreign nations, or a place whence such articles are intended to be exported. And, when taken into custody, they are not permitted to be removed without bonds being given for their being relanded in some place whence, in the opinion of the collector, there is no danger of their being exported.

Without warrant founded on proof, from suspicion only, may this unbounded license be exercised. Our houses, heretofore our castles, and the secure abodes of our families, may be thrown open to the visits of collectors to search for and seize our money and goods, whenever instigated by suspicion, prejudice, resentment, or party spirit.

No place is to be protected; the people may every where be exposed, at home, on the way, and abroad. Specie and goods thus seized without warrant, and on suspicion only, are not to be removed unless and until bond with sureties shall be given for landing or delivering the same in some place of the United States, whence, in the opinion of the collector, there shall not be any danger of such articles being exported. These provisions strike at the vital principles of a free government; and are they not contrary to the fourth and sixth articles of amendments to the constitution? Are not these searches and seizures, without warrant, on the mere suspicion of a collector, unreasonable searches and seizures? And is not a man thereby to be deprived of property without due process of law?

The military may be employed by such person as the President may have empowered. He may designate, at certain places in the States, persons to call out such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as may be judged necessary. Those will be selected who are most convenient and in all respects qualified to act in the scenes to which they may be called. In these appointments the Senate is to have no concurrence. They are to be Presidential agents for issuing requisitions to the standing army, for militia, and not amenable to any tribunal for their conduct. Heretofore a delicate and respectful attention has been paid to the State authorities on this subject. The requisitions of the General Government for the militia have been made to the Governors of the States; and what reason is there for taking a different course to enforce the embargo?

Under our present system have not insurrections been suppressed, rebellions quelled, and combinations and resistance against lawful authority overcome, by the force of the General Government in co-operation with the State Governments? Is not the authority of the marshals competent to the execution of the laws? I see no cause for these arrays of the military throughout the country, and the unrestrained license that is to be given to its operations. It is a fundamental principle of a free government, "that the military be kept in subordination to the civil power," and never be put in motion until those be found incompetent to preserve the public peace and authority. But, by the provisions of this bill, these Presidential agents may call out the standing army or militia, or part of them, to follow in the collector's train, to seize specie and goods in houses, stores, and elsewhere, and generally for executing the embargo laws. And even the public peace, so far as respects the suppressing armed and riotous assemblages of persons resisting the custom-house officers in the exercise of their duties, it would seem can no longer be confided to the States, and it is thought necessary to surround custom-house officers with bands of the standing army or militia.

The bill before us is bottomed on a report of the Secretary of the Treasury. How often were his strenuous remonstrances, and those of the chairman of the committee who reported the bill, (Mr. Giles,) formerly heard against the extension of the Executive patronage and influence; the interference of the General Government in the local policy of the States, and, the ordinary concerns of the people; and, above all, against standing armies? Then no such Executive prerogatives were claimed as this bill contains; no such attempts made as here are made for intrenchments on the internal policy of the States, and the ordinary concerns of the people; and then our army, small in comparison with the present establishment, was kept aloof from the affairs of the State, and the persons and property of the citizens. Our country was happy, prosperous, and respected. The present crisis is portentous. Internal disquiets will not be healed, nor public sentiment controlled, by precipitate and rash measures. It is time for the public councils to pause. This bill, sir, ought not to pass. It strikes at the vital principles of our republican system. It proposes to place the country in a time of peace under military law, the first appearance of which ought here to be resisted with all our talents and efforts. It proposes to introduce a military despotism, to which freemen can never submit, and which can never govern except by terror and carnage.

Tuesday, December 20

Enforcement of the Embargo

Mr. Giles said, I am sensible that I owe an apology to the Senate, as chairman of the committee, for not having made an exposition of the objects and principles of the bill, reported for consideration, at an earlier stage of the discussion. This omission has not in the smallest degree been influenced by any apprehension, that these principles are indefensible; but, in some degree, from a desire to screen myself, as much as possible, from intermixing in discussions; a task which is never agreeable, but is at present peculiarly distressing and afflicting to my feelings. I also thought that the session had already been sufficiently fruitful of discussions intimately connected with the bill before us; and that the public interests, at this time, required action. I know, too, sir, that I owe an apology to the Senate, for the great number of amendments which, under their indulgence, has been made to this bill after it was first presented to their consideration. But, sir, you will find some apology in the intrinsic difficulty and delicacy of the subject itself, and also in the disposition manifested by the committee, to give to the objections made by the opponents of the bill, that respectful attention to which many of them were certainly entitled, and to accommodate its provisions, as far as possible, to the views of those gentlemen. After every effort, however, to effect this object, it still appears that the bill presents temptations for addressing the popular sensibility too strong to be resisted by gentlemen in the opposition. They have, accordingly, with great zeal and ability, described the provisions of the bill as dangerous and alarming to the rights and liberties of the people. This, sir, is the common course of opposition, and applies to every strong measure requiring the exercise of much Executive discretion. I think, however, I shall be able to show that there is no new principle contained in the provisions of that bill; but that every provision it contains is amply justified by precedents in pre-existing laws, which have not been found to be so destructive to the rights of the people, as gentlemen strenuously insist similar provisions in this bill will be, if they receive the sanction of law. In performing this task, I shall bring into view only such parts of the bill as have been objected to by gentlemen, presuming that, as their objections have evidently been the result of great industry and deliberation, all other parts of the bill remain unobjectionable. I shall also, perhaps, avoid some of the observations respecting minute details; apply my remarks generally to principles; and thus bring my observations and replies into as short a compass as possible.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Goodrich) commenced his remarks by declaring the embargo to be a permanent measure, deprecating its effects, as ruinous at home and ineffectual abroad. These observations have been repeatedly made by others, and already replied to by several gentlemen, as well as myself; and I am strengthened in the correctness of those replies by all the further reflections I have been enabled to bestow upon them. This part of the subject will, therefore, be passed over without further notice, except to remark, that perhaps one of the causes of the inefficacy of the measure abroad, has been the unprincipled violations of its provisions at home; and the great and leading object of the present bill is to prevent such violations. Upon this part of the subject I am happy to find that one of its most strenuous and judicious opposers (Mr. Hillhouse) has candidly informed the Senate, that the provisions of the bill are admirably calculated to effect that object – and if in their practical operation they should realize the character anticipated by that gentleman, I shall feel no regret for that portion of labor I have bestowed upon them. Indeed, I shall congratulate the committee as well as myself in having been so fortunate as to find a competent remedy for so great an evil.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Goodrich) informs us, that the public councils are pressing on to measures pregnant with the most alarming results. I hope the gentleman is mistaken in his apprehensions, and I should have been much pleased if the gentleman had been good enough to point them to a better course; but, sir, he has not done so, nor has any gentleman on the same side of the question. Indeed, sir, it would give me great pleasure to do something that would be agreeable to our Eastern friends; but, unfortunately, amidst all the intrinsic difficulties which press upon us, that seems to be not among the least of them. The gentlemen themselves will not explicitly tell us what would produce the effect – and I am inclined to think that nothing short of putting the Government in their hands would do it. Even this would not be exempt from difficulties. The gentlemen from that part of the United States are nearly equally divided among themselves respecting the proper course of measures to be pursued, and there is an immense majority in every other part of the United States, in favor of the measures proposed; we are therefore surrounded with real and intrinsic difficulties from every quarter, and those of a domestic nature are infinitely the most formidable, and most to be deprecated. Indeed, sir, under present circumstances, the administration of the Government cannot be a pleasant task; and, in my judgment, it requires a great effort of patriotism to undertake it, not on account of external pressures, but on account of internal discontents, stimulated, too, by so many artful intrigues. But for these unfortunate circumstances, every gentleman would feel an honorable pride in contributing his efforts to devise measures for repelling foreign aggressions, and he would court the responsibility attached to his station. I would not, Mr. President, give up a scintilla of that portion of the responsibility which the crisis imposes on me. Indeed, sir, to have the honor of bearing my full share of it, is the only inducement I have at this moment for occupying a place on this floor. Without that consideration I should now be in retirement. But when I turn my eyes upon internal divisions, discontents and violations of law, and am compelled to think of measures for their suppression, it produces the most painful sensations and distressing reflections.

The great principle of objection, the gentlemen tell us, consists in the transfer of legislative powers to the Executive Department. This is an old an abstract question, often heretofore brought into view, and leads to endless discussion. I think I shall be able to show that the bill introduces no new principle in this respect, but only applies an established principle to new practical objects. The general principle of the separation of departments is generally admitted in the abstract; but the difficulties in this discussion arise from applying the principle to practical objects. The great difficulty exists in the attempt to fix on the precise boundary line between legislative and Executive powers in their practical operation. This is not possi-¹ You might attempt the search for the philosopher's stone, or the discovery of the perpetual motion, with as much prospect of success. The reason of this difficulty is, that the practical objects and events to which this abstract principle is attempted to be applied, are perpetually varying, according to the practical progression of human affairs, and therefore cannot admit of any uniform standard of application. This reflection might have saved the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) the trouble of reading to us the constitution or bill of rights of Massachusetts, in which the principle of separation of departments is very clearly and properly laid down, and which will be very readily assented to in the abstract, but which forms no part of the question in dispute. It cannot, however, escape observation, that this principle is not laid down, even in the abstract, in the Constitution of the United States; and, although it is the leading principle of the constitution, and probably was the principal guide in its formation, it is nevertheless in several respects departed from.

This body partakes essentially both of the legislative and Executive powers of the Government. The Executive Department also partakes of the legislative powers, as far at least as an approbation of, and a qualified negative of the laws extend, &c. I make these observations, however, not in derogation of the general principle of the separation of powers among the several departments, so far as is practicable, but merely to show that there must necessarily be some limitations in its practical operation. Perhaps the best general rule for guiding our discretion upon this subject will be found to consist in this: That legislation ought to extend as far as definition is practicable – when definition stops, execution must necessarily begin. But some of the particular provisions of this bill will furnish more precise illustrations of my opinions upon this question; it will, therefore, be waived until I shall come to their consideration.

I will now proceed to examine the more particular objections urged against the detail of this bill. Its provisions respecting the coasting trade are said to be objectionable in the following respects:

First objection: The penalty of the bonds required, is said to be excessive. To enable us to decide correctly upon this point, the object proposed to be effected, and the penalty required, should be considered in reference to each other. The object is to prevent, by means of coasting vessels, domestic articles from being carried abroad. Flour, for instance, to the West Indies. The price of that article here is less than five dollars; in the West Indies it is said to be thirty and upward. The penalty of the bonds required is six times the amount of the value of the vessel and cargo. Is any gentleman prepared to say a smaller penalty will effect the object? I presume not. Indeed, the committee were disposed to put it at the lowest possible point, consistently with an effectuation of the object; and probably it is rather too low for that purpose. As to the penalty, according to the tonnage of vessels, it is believed no alteration in the existing laws is made in that respect. These penalties will appear the more reasonable, when it is recollected, that through the indulgence given of the coasting trade, most of the violations of the embargo laws have been contrived and effected.

Second objection: The collectors may be influenced by party spirit in the exercise of their discretion. It is hoped that this will not be the case, and if it were, it would certainly be much to be regretted. It may, however, probably happen, and is one of the inconveniences of the system.

Third objection: The high penalties of the bonds will drive many persons of small means from their accustomed occupations. They will not be able to procure the competent security for their prosecution. It is not to be presumed that this will be the effect to any great extent. If the owner is known to be honest, and has in view legal and honest objects, I have very little apprehension of his not being able to get the security required. But here the question recurs, are these apprehended inconveniences of such a nature as to render it necessary to abandon a great national object, for the accommodation of a few individuals who are affected by them? Is the last effort to preserve the peace of the nation, to be abandoned from these considerations? I should conclude, certainly not.

The next objections are made to the seventh section of the bill, which provides that stress of weather, and other unavoidable accidents at sea, shall not be given in evidence in a trial at law to save the penalty of bonds given as security against the violation of the embargo laws. It is known that, through pretexts derived from this permission, at present, most of the violations of these laws have been committed with impunity – it is, therefore, important to the future execution of the laws, to take away these pretexts. But it is objected that this regulation manifests a distrust of oaths. It does, of what is called custom-house oaths; their violation is already almost proverbial; it does not, however, produce nor encourage this profligacy; it takes away the temptation to it. It is further said, it impairs the trial by jury – very far from it; the trial by jury still exists; this provision only regulates the evidence to be produced before the jury. Gentlemen state particular hardships which may take place under this regulation. It is easy to state possible hardships under any general regulation; but they have never been deemed sufficient objections to general regulations producing in other respects beneficial results. This bill, however, contains a provision for relief in all cases of hardships under the embargo laws. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant relief in all such cases. This power, vested in the Secretary, is also objected to. It is said to manifest a distrust of courts, and to transfer their powers to the Secretary of the Treasury. Whatever may be my distrust of some of the courts of the United States, I can say that consideration furnished no inducement to this provision. It is a power not suited to the organization of courts, and it has for a long time been exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury without being complained of. Congress proceeded with great caution on this subject. On the third day of March, 1797, they first introduced this principle into their laws in relation to the collection of the revenue; and, after an experiment of nearly three years, on the eleventh day of February, 1800, they made the law perpetual. This will appear from the 12th section of this bill, which merely borrows this provision from pre-existing laws. It introduces no new principle whatever. This doctrine is carried still further, by an act passed the 3d of March, 1807, in the eighth volume of the laws, page 318:

"An Act to prevent settlements being made on lands ceded to the United States, until authorized by law.

"And it shall moreover be lawful for the President of the United States to direct the Marshal, or officer acting as Marshal, in the manner hereinafter directed, and also to take such other measures, and to employ such military force as he may judge necessary and proper, to remove from lands ceded, or secured to the United States by treaty, or cession as aforesaid, any person or persons who shall hereafter take possession of the same, or make or attempt to make a settlement thereon, until authorized by law."

Here the President is authorized to use the military force to remove settlers from the public lands without the intervention of courts; and the reason is, that the peculiarity of the case is not suited to the jurisdiction of courts, nor would their powers be competent to the object, nor, indeed, are courts allowed to interfere with any claims of individuals against the United States, but Congress undertakes to decide upon all such cases finally and peremptorily, without the intervention of courts.