Читать книгу: «Britain at Bay», страница 5
X
DYNAMICS—THE QUESTION OF MIGHT
If there is a chance of a conflict in which Great Britain is to be engaged, her people must take thought in time how they may have on their side both right and might. It is hard to see how otherwise they can expect the contest to be decided in their favour.
As I have said before, in the quarrel you must be in the right and in the fight you must win. The quarrel is the domain of policy, the fight that of strategy or dynamics. Policy and strategy are in reality inextricably interwoven one with another, for right and might resemble, more than is commonly supposed, two aspects of the same thing. But it is convenient in the attempt to understand any complicated subject to examine its aspects separately.
I propose, therefore, in considering the present situation of Great Britain and her relations to the rest of the world, to treat first of the question of force, to assume that a quarrel may arise, and to ascertain what are the conditions in which Great Britain can expect to win, and then to enter into the question of right, in order to find out what light can be thrown upon the necessary aims and methods of British policy by the conclusions which will have been reached as to the use of force.
The nationalisation of States, which is the fundamental fact of modern history, affects both policy and strategy. If the State is a nation, the population associated as one body, then the force which it can use in case of conflict represents the sum of the energies of the whole population, and this force cannot and will not be used except as the expression of the will of the whole population. The policy of such a State means its collective will, the consciousness of its whole population of a purpose, mission, or duty which it must fulfil, with which it is identified, and which, therefore, it cannot abandon. Only in case this national purpose meets with resistance will a people organised as a State enter into a quarrel, and if such a quarrel has to be fought out the nation's resources will be expended upon it without limitation.
The chief fact in regard to the present condition of Europe appears to be the very great excess in the military strength of Germany over that of any other Power. It is due in part to the large population of the German Empire, and in part to the splendid national organisation which has been given to it. It cannot be asserted either that Germany was not entitled to become united, or that she was not entitled to organise herself as efficiently as possible both for peace and for war. But the result is that Germany has a preponderance as great if not greater than that of Spain in the time of Philip II., or of France either under Louis XIV. or under Napoleon. Every nation, no doubt, has a right to make itself as strong as it can, and to exercise as much influence as it can on the affairs of the world. To do these things is the mission and business of a nation. But the question arises, what are the limits to the power of a single nation? The answer appears to be that the only limits are those set by the power of other nations. This is the theory of the balance of power of which the object is to preserve to Europe its character of a community of independent States rather than that of a single empire in which one State predominates.
Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design of injustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give her in case of dispute, always possible between independent States, a corresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whose intentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibility of such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepare herself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germany upon equal terms.
Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either of averting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise and cannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitrament of war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. Great Britain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war and must make preparation for war the nation's first business until a reasonable security has been attained.
The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain in case of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the old wars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navy to obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partly to destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination of these three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuable help to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance was as useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the same conditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtain control of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has been settled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes it impracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she wins it, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostile Power, while the British military forces available for employment on the Continent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result is that Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatly reduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, but perhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powers are organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still in the condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standing army, a purely professional navy, and a large half-trained force, called Territorial, neither ready for war nor available outside the United Kingdom.
There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain's weakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire. That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most careful examination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, be rejected.
In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combination the assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from the King's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war must in the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that the colonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain's naval strength as they may have given during the preceding period of peace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt make an appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the two contending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would be little more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offer a certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which Great Britain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if all the colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armies could give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single European ally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must rely upon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain if it were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause in which she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for their co-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistance would be likely to turn the scale in their favour.
Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more in case of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continental allies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them. One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists—the desire of other nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continent rests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It is increased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire—an empire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is proved by the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Government to build four "Dreadnoughts," resolved to revive that tradition.
Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardly begun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, is helpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that of Germany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of the struggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. The position of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people are not attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrian policy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of the Adriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the French occupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possible that if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipate herself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policy were such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of them desirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their own distinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whether their strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict, especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central position with all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength of the central position consists in the power which it gives to its holder to keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throws the bulk of them into a decisive blow against another.
This is the situation of to-day on the Continent of Europe. It cannot be changed unless there is thrown into the scale of the possible opponents of German policy a weight or a force that would restore the equality of the two parties. The British navy, however perfect it may be assumed to be, does not in itself constitute such a force. Nor could the British army on its present footing restore the balance. A small standing army able to give its allies assistance, officially estimated at a strength of 160,000 men, will not suffice to turn the scale in a conflict in which the troops available for each of the great Powers are counted no longer by the hundred thousand but by the million. But if Great Britain were so organised that she could utilise for the purpose of war the whole of her national resources, if she had in addition to the navy indispensable for her security an army equal in efficiency to the best that can be found in Europe and in numbers to that maintained by Italy, which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equal in territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, and either the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of fresh conflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of what has happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threatened domination, of the independence of the European States.
The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the close attention of the British nation, for it means that England might at any time be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take the form of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empire in the world, supported by another military empire which is itself in the front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would be looking on comparatively helpless.
But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powers might not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It is much more probable that they would have to choose between one side and the other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enough to help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may be compelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that case Great Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence against the combined forces of the Continent.
That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one am unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and able to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone conclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her ready for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of preventing its occurrence.
XI
POLICY—THE QUESTION OF RIGHT
I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a position of some peril. She has not created for herself the means of making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would have allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absence of might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends upon the nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her own people, and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to be on her side. From this point of view must be considered the relations between Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims of German policy.
A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizens does not go to war lightly. The German ideal, since the foundation of the Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by Lord Rosebery in the words:
"Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance."
The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, and this was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving its training but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers. In the first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not only with Austria, but with Russia. When in 1876 disturbances began in the Balkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exerted herself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after the Russo-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side and Austria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war the European treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano.
After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in 1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date Italy became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of a century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent collapse of Russia's military power removed that danger.
Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were very anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special rights in regard to Morocco.
The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains the following clause:
"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require."
This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britain assumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled to exercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some British superiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had a special right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she could dispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea that France was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herself anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. Accordingly Germany had her way.
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and Montenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogether disconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented the annexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in the matter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any case be prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilising her army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubt that she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen that Russia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in the moment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition to Austro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upon a political decision of the military strength, readiness, and determination of the two central Powers.
A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by the disclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the earlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the later negotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert that in either case a British Government would have been justified in armed opposition to Germany's policy.
The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, ending as they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosed to the British public the serious nature of the competition in naval shipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class in this country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten fact that a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being able and ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There is no reason to believe that the German Government has any intention to enter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests held to be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may hold vital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite ready to admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully to scrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and to be quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views are right and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, in case of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the German Empire.
If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any other State, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issue about which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpable wrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them to resist it with all their might.
The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong in herself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure of the assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture to oppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to have acquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt to convert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by her own people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on the Continent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function to be the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though the doubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling this role.
But there is another side to the case. The opinion has long been expressed by German writers and is very widespread in Germany that it is Great Britain that claims an ascendency or supremacy, and that Germany in opposing that supremacy is making herself the champion of the European cause of the independence of States. This German idea was plainly expressed twenty-five years ago by the German historian Wilhelm M|ller, who wrote in a review of the year 1884: "England was the opponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decades assumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintained upon land under Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. The years 1870-1871 broke the French spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of her maritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce it of her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell too. It is true, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only a coalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call up such a coalition." The language which Englishmen naturally use in discussing their country's naval strength might seem to lend itself to the German interpretation. For example, on the 10th March 1908, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressing an opinion in which he thought both parties concurred, said: "We must maintain the unassailable supremacy of this country at sea." Here, at any rate, is the word "supremacy " at which the Germans take umbrage, and which our own people regard as objectionable if applied to the position of any Power on the Continent.
I will not repeat here the analysis which I published many years ago of the dealings between the German and British Governments during the period when German colonial enterprise was beginning; nor the demonstration that in those negotiations the British Government acted with perfect fairness, but was grossly misrepresented to the German public. The important thing for the people of Great Britain to understand to-day is not the inner diplomatic history of that and subsequent periods, but the impression which is current in Germany with regard to the whole of these transactions.
The Germans think that Great Britain lays claim to a special position in regard to the ocean, in the nature of a suzerainty over the waters of the globe, and over those of its coasts which are not the possessions of some strong civilised Power. What they have perceived in the last quarter of a century has been that, somehow or other, they care not how, whenever there has been a German attempt in the way of what is called colonial expansion, it has led to friction with Great Britain. Accordingly they have the impression that Great Britain is opposed to any such German expansion, and in this way, as they are anxious for dominions beyond the sea and for the spread of their trade into every quarter of the globe, they have come to regard Great Britain as the adversary. This German feeling found vent during the South African War, and the expressions at that time freely used in the German newspapers, as well as by German writers whose works were less ephemeral, could not but deeply offend the national consciousness, to any nothing of the pride of the people of this country. In this way the sympathy which used to exist between the two peoples has been lost and they have come to regard each other with suspicion, which has not been without its effect on the relations between the two Governments and upon the course of European diplomacy. This is the origin of the rivalry, and it is to the resentment which has been diligently cultivated in Germany against the supposed British claim to supremacy at sea that is attributable the great popularity among the people of Germany of the movement in favour of the expansion of the German navy. Since 1884 the people of Germany have been taught to regard with suspicion every item of British policy, and naturally enough this auspicious attitude has found its counterpart among the people of this country. The result has been that the agreements by which England has disposed of a number of disagreements with France and with Russia have been regarded in Germany as inspired by the wish to prepare a coalition against that country, and, in view of the past history of Great Britain, this interpretation can hardly be pronounced unnatural.
Any cause for which Great Britain would fight ought to be intelligible to other nations, first of all to those of Europe, but also to the nations outside of Europe, at any rate to the United States and Japan, for if we were fighting for something in regard to which there was no sympathy with us, or which led other nations to sympathise with our adversary, we should be hampered by grave misgivings and might find ourselves alone in a hostile world.
Accordingly it cannot be sound policy for Great Britain to assert for herself a supremacy or ascendency of the kind which is resented, not only by Germany, but by every other continental State, and indeed by every maritime State in the world. It ought to be made clear to all the world that in fact, whatever may have been the language used in English discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, or over territories bordering on the sea, not forming parts of the British Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can in case of war secure the "command" of the sea against her enemies, she regards the sea, in peace, and in war except for her enemies, as the common property of all nations, the open road forming the great highway of mankind.
We have but to reflect on the past to perceive that the idea of a dominion of the sea must necessarily unite other nations against us. What in the sixteenth century was the nature of the dispute between England and Spain? The British popular consciousness to-day remembers two causes, of which one was religious antagonism, and the other the claim set up by Spain and rejected by England to a monopoly of America, carrying with it an exclusive right to navigation in the Western Atlantic and to a monopoly of the trade of the Spanish dominions beyond the sea. That is a chapter of history which at the present time deserves a place in the meditations of Englishmen.
I may now try to condense into a single view the general survey of the conditions of Europe which I have attempted from the two points of view of strategy and of policy, of force and of right. Germany has such a preponderance of military force that no continental State can stand up against her. There is, therefore, on the Continent no nation independent of German influence or pressure. Great Britain, so long as she maintains the superiority of her navy over that of Germany or over those of Germany and her allies, is not amenable to constraint by Germany, but her military weakness prevents her exerting any appreciable counter pressure upon Germany.
The moment the German navy has become strong enough to confront that of Great Britain without risk of destruction, British influence in Europe will be at an end, and the Continent will have to follow the direction given by German policy. That is a consummation to be desired neither in the interest of the development of the European nations nor in that of Great Britain. It means the prevalence of one national ideal instead of the growth side by side of a number of types. It means also the exclusion of British ideals from European life.
Great Britain has in the past been a powerful contributor to the free development of the European nations, and therefore to the preservation in Europe of variety of national growth. I believe that she is now called upon to renew that service. The method open to her lies in such action as may relieve the other European States from the overwhelming pressure which, in case of the disappearance of England from the European community, would be put upon them by Germany. It seems probable that in default of right action she will be compelled to maintain her national ideals against Europe united under German guidance. The action required consists on the one hand in the perfecting of the British navy, and on the other of the military organisation of the British people on the principle, already explained, of the nationalisation of war.
