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Subversion is a form of violence and coercion, albeit “cultural,” “symbolic,” or “systemic,” using Johan Galtung’s or Slavoj Žižek’s terms.16 It is a self-perpetuated project that is informed by Russia’s “‘schematic narrative template’ […] a social construct created to shape collective memory to fight external enemies, and this template was constantly reinforced and shaped by history itself in Russia.”17 It is rooted in Russia’s “historic mission” and “civilizational choice,” and, more broadly, in Russian culture.
In his insightful book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has noted that for many, the end of the Cold War signified the end of conflicts in global politics.18 In the late 1990s, however, Huntington predicted that the world would inevitably change after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it would not necessarily become peaceful. “Change was inevitable, progress was not,” he wrote.19 Indeed, the world encountered a new wave of ethnic and neo-imperial wars, frozen conflicts, and genocides. The estimations of wars and high and low intensity conflicts that occurred in the world within two years after 1991 are mindboggling: 48 ethnic wars and 164 conflicts erupted due to ethnic-territorial claims.20 By 1996, “[w]ithin five years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic conflicts spilled over two hundred hot spots throughout its vast territory, most of them in the Russian Federation.”21 Russia played a pivotal role in inflaming and steering them. The most notorious examples of armed and low intensity conflicts accompanied by chaos and mass deaths are Russia’s two wars in Chechnya and its genocide of the Chechens.22
Although Huntington’s interpetation about Russian-Ukrainian relations and histories has certain limitations, his civilizational approach to conflicts and wars that were escalated after 1991 seems to be prophetic in light of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and conventional war in Ukraine’s Donbas. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander identified the Russian campaign in Crimea as “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg” in history.23 In Huntington’s terms, Russia’s conventional and hybrid war against Ukraine is a cultural war and a war of identities. The disintegration of the Cold War world inspired peoples and nations to seek identity and reinvent ethnicity, a process in which the discourse about enemies and hostilities toward them became an inseparable part of emerging ideologies, narratives, and practices. Deep and historically bound differences among civilizational identities and cultures shaped the severity of cultural conflicts, changing the balance of power among civilizations and exacerbating enmities among them across the cultural fault lines.24
The global politics of the post-Cold War world illuminated a general trend of new communication patterns: civilizations with similar cultures were coming together, and those with different cultures were coming apart. Alliances were built across similar cultural lines, and conflicts emerged because of cultural and ideological differences that seemed to be amplified with the passage of time.25 In this context, the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the differences between these two civilizations that appear to be substantial and, thus, their clash seems to be logical and inevitable. As a militarily competitor that is stronger than Ukraine, Russia attempts to redraw political boundaries that should coincide with its cultural boundaries, real or imagined. This can only be accomplished from a position of force, as regionalism has never been an accurate term that would ultimately assume or condition the cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. “Regions are geographical not political or cultural entities,”26 and volatile and turbulent relations between these two states have been shaped by shared geography but different histories, having produced a phenomenon of two different cultures and civilizations that contest shared geography and reject volitional cooperation.
Putin’s 2014 attack against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and Russian intense non-conventional warfare largely dissolved multiple identities in Ukraine and crystallized the most important and meaningful identity among the Ukrainians, associated with concepts such as solidarity and unity necessary for the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression. Putinism exacerbated the identity differences between these two states, pulling them further apart and creating the foundation for a multi-generational enduring conflict and the human casualties it causes.
Huntington’s civilizational approach helps us better understand the vector and the severity of Russian active measures in Ukraine and beyond. Most importantly, checking the blind spot and learning more about the cultural and often irreconcilable differences among civilizations might enhance our ability to recognize a narrative that motivates “subverters” to launch a hybrid or disinformation war against those who advance competing narratives and discourses. In other words, for diagnostic purposes, it is necessary to learn in depth the cultural histories of entities involved in a conflict and to go beyond an analysis of the intelligence aspect of their national and transnational histories, international relations, and foreign policies.
This volume is a step in this direction. This collection of essays written by scholars and specialists in intelligence studies and Soviet/Russian history, culture, and politics illuminates the multifaceted nature and the broad geographic mosaic of Russian active measures. The focal point is Ukraine. The violent lawlessness of Russia’s 2014 covert operation in Crimea, “accompanied by a blizzard of Russian denials and false flags,” opened a “new era of global information warfare, in which countries and non-state actors use social media and disinformation to create their own narratives and undermine anyone who opposes them.”27 Ukraine’s case is most instructive and classic for those who would like to study Soviet/Russian active measures and political warfare in its terrain and beyond.28 The range of Soviet/Russian special operations and subversive practices in Ukraine has been all-encompassing since the Cold War era. Historical studies and analyses of the most current events in Ukraine, including its territories occupied by Russia-backed separatists, such as the Donbas, will offer readers a glimpse into Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns that prepare the space for potential covert operations and a military take-over. They reveal a wide array of tactics and practices used by Russian intelligence, from disinformation to memory wars, and the use of paramilitary forces (the “little green men” in Crimea who were Russian Spetsnaz) and cyber technology. Many scholars have emphasized that “re-historicizing interpretations of active measures through the lens of Russian/Soviet history is a necessary prerequisite to contemporary analysis of similar Russian activities,”29 and this volume is an attempt to observe Russian psychological warfare through historical and philosophical lenses.
The studies included in this collection demonstrate with absolute clarity that Russia’s historical and philosophical traditions, and its new nationalist ideology underpin and inform a variety of influence campaigns in contemporary Ukraine, Italy, Sweden, France, and Estonia, accentuating the evolution of Russian active measures and revealing that today they target not only people’s minds but also technologies and the state’s governmental infrastructure.30 The proactive nature of these campaigns and Putin’s expansionism (a desire to extend Russia’s influence and its borders) are analyzed by exploring the extent of Russia’s cultural connections overseas and its infiltration of Western academia and cultural establishments. Through thorough research, the contributors of this collection have shown that, building a cyber and conventional army and coopting Russian and foreign journalists, scholars, and politicians, Putin ultimately has built a reputation of a powerful and invincible leader of a new Russian state, a supersized KGB/FSB/SVR/GRU entity that solves foreign policy and diplomacy issues through force, bullying, and intimidation. The most frequently used rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin offices, such as the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, include an emphasis on Russian “mirror actions” in response to the “aggressive Western alliances’ behavior.” A Russian narrative with a traditional binary model encompassing “us” vs “them” which is instrumental in Russian disinformation campaigns (Russia as a victim that resists Ukrainian nationalists and neo-fascists, as well as Western pressure) is effectively deconstructed and exposed by several authors in this collection.
Ironically, Russian history that helps us better understand the nature and the roots of active measures is being actively rewritten in the Russian Federation under Putin and by Putin himself.31 On 18 June 2020, The National Interest published an essay written by Putin in which he reassesses the meaning of the 1938 Munich conference, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the Yalta Conference. The studies included in this collection highlight the toxic nature of Russian memory politics that is capable of obscuring narratives other than Russian and of coopting Russian and Western historians. In this context, it became clear that one has to learn Russian history through more objective sources and studies, conceived and published outside the heavily censored and ideologically guarded space of the Russian Federation, not under the patronage of its current political leadership. Importantly, as several studies in this collection argue, Russian history should be studied through national historical narratives produced in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and other states of post-Soviet space. They help observe a shared goal of Russian active measures and memory wars that create a space for uncertainty and doubt about the truth, discouraging and preventing individuals and states from pursuing it. This space is unattended, unregulated, and ungoverned. As Shane Harris has noted, ungoverned spaces eventually fall apart,32 or are filled by another force that typically establishes its own regulations and rules that help control its narrative. Whoever controls information and whoever controls the narrative has power, and as Soviet/Russian history has demonstrated, power is a paramount consideration and concern in the Russian civilization.
Today, the world cannot complain that there is a lack of information. On the contrary, an ordinary consumer is crushed by information from all sides. Richard Stengel reminded us that the U.S. Library of Congress alone has 39 million books.33 Yet, Russian information warfare seems to have limited people’s choices of sources, persuading many that Russia has a monopoly on truth. Peter Pomerantsev has aptly noted that “[m]ore information was supposed to mean a more informed debate, but we seem less capable of deliberation than ever. More information was supposed to mean mutual understanding across borders, but it has also made possible new and more subtle forms of conflict and subversion.”34 Mutual understanding across borders, the future without conflict, and cooperation among civilizations might be possible only if international order and peace are maintained. The problem with the latter, as well as international law and order that has been consistently violated by the Russian Federation since 2014, seems to rest in cultural differences between world civilizations and their leaders’ cultural understandings of order. Huntington was convinced that in the future “the world will be ordered on the basis of civilization or not at all.”35 Those civilizations that are culturally close will come together, and those who are drastically different will come apart.
We are living in a time when this process has been accelerated, and Russia is a key player in that process. The Russian secret biochemical weapons program and laboratories function at full capacity, Novichok is being produced and used, the territories of foreign states are annexed, passenger liners are shot down by Russian BUKs, the “Kremlin’s assassination program”36 is active and has new young trainees (employees of the GRU), American students and scholars are coopted and recruited through FSB front organizations, and history is being rewritten because of Putin, for Putin, and by Putin himself. Bezmenov, who in 1984 expressed serious concerns about Russian subversive activities that, from his point of view, had been quite successful in North America, did not have an opportunity to observe the extent of Russian active measures after 2014, having died under mysterious circumstances in Canada in 1993 at the age of 54. A quarter of a century later, the veteran of Russian intelligence Oleg Kalugin was similarly concerned, stating that “current developments in Russia are highly disturbing,” referencing Zbigniew Brzezinski who foresaw the emergence of a new form of fascist nationalism in Russia.37 This volume is designed to raise public awareness of these trends and Russian active measures that beyond ideological motivations also have financial ones. As Kalugin has suggested, “the KGB was an organization. There are no organizations in Russia now, just organized crime.”38 The authors in this volume consider a discussion about Russian overt and covert operations of ideological subversion timely and necessary, as thorough analyses of the current developments in Russia and agnotological inquiries produce concerns, and thus solutions.39
While this book answers many questions about Russian active measures, it also provokes new questions. Can we all learn the skills of diagnostics or does only naturally acquired cultural knowledge help recognize subversion imposed on us? Can we map a false narrative? Can we distinguish between reality and falsehoods? Will Russia discontinue active measures, and when and where will Putin stop? Theodor Adorno once compared Nazi Germany, engaged in mass killings, with a serial killer who could not stop unless he was stopped.40 By analogy, the Russian economist, senior fellow at the CATO Institute, and former economic policy adviser to Putin Andrei Illarionov has emphasized the danger of Putin and the regime he established in Russia. Over the last decade, one can observe that the Russian Government led by Putin has become authoritarian at home with clear features of fascist ideology, as some scholars have argued, and more aggressive and destabilizing in its foreign policy.41 Illarionov has offered several suggestions about how the international community can stop Putin and his hybrid war against Russia’s neighboring states and the West.42 The initial stage includes the process of learning and understanding Russian culture and civilization.
By the time you finish reading this book, you will be able to answer some of the aforementioned questions. However, you will certainly have questions of your own. Indeed, much more should be done. Research should be continued, the former KGB archives should be mined, and studies have to be published to identify and analyze the blind spot of Russian active measures. Thus far, there are no signs of Putinism receding into the past, and hence the history of Russian active measures will be expanded. Their geography will be broadened, their tools will be perfected, and their technological support will be advanced. The world might radically change in the nearest future because of cataclysmic events, similar to COVID-19. What likely will stay permanent is Russian narratives used by “subverters.” And Russia’s battle to promote them will continue.
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1 The term chekists refers to those who worked/work for the Soviet/Russian secret services. It originated from the abbreviation used for the Bolshevik’s secret police—VChK, also known as Cheka (its full name Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia kommissiia po borbe s kontrrevoliutsiiei i sabotazhem/the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage), created on 7 (20) December 1917. In 1923, the VChK was replaced by the OGPU/GPU (1923–1934) (Obiedinennoie Gosudarstvennoie Politicheskoie Upravleniie/the United State Political Administration, also known as the Joint State Political Directorate). The functions of the OGPU were transferred to the NKVD in 1934 (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del/the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) which in 1946 was renamed to the MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti/the Ministry of State Security). In 1948, the military personnel of the foreign intelligence service were returned to the Soviet military, known today at the GRU (Glavnoie Razvedovatelnoie Upravleniie/the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). The KGB emerged in 1954 and was reformed after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Today in the Russian Federation, the functions of the KGB are performed by the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshei Razvedki/the Foreign Intelligence Service), the FSB (Federalnaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti/the Federal Security Service, before 1995 the Federal Counterintelligence Service), and the FSO (Federalnaia Sluzhba Okhrany/the Federal Protective Service).
2 Although the term emerged after the Second World War in the 1950s, the strategies, tactics, and tools of active measures have been designed and perfected since the early 1920s.
3 Kevin N. McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns Against the West: From the Cold War to Putin (North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 374. The concept of the “Russian World” (Russkii mir) emerged in the 1990s but was vigorously promoted by Putin in 2014 to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. The idea of gathering all Russian-speaking people under one “roof,” the Orthodox Christianity, and possibly being included in one political entity, the Russian Federation, motivated the current political regime in Russia to pursue this idea for Russia’s nationalist interests and security. For a detailed discussion about the Russkii mir, see Marlene Laruelle, The “Russian World”: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination (Washington, D.C.: Center of Global Interests, 2015); also available at https://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf (accessed 19 June 2020).
4 For more on Rossutrudnichestvo and its ties to Russian intelligence, see a chapter in this volume written by Massimiliano Di Pasquale and Luigi Sergio Germani; Molly Redden, “FBI Probing Whether Russia Used Cultural Junkets to Recruit American Intelligence Assets,” Mother Jones, 23 October 2013, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/10/fbi-investigating-yury-zaytsev-russian-diplomat-spy/ (accessed 17 June 2020); “Spy vs. Spy—Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s Agent of Influence Finder,” Minding Russia, 25 October 2013, https://3dblogger.typepad.com/minding_russia/2013/10/spy-vs-spy-rossotrudnichestvo-russias-agent-of-influence-finder.html (accessed 17 June 2020); for a discussion about Russia’s recruitment of American students, exchange programs, and co-opted American scholars, see Yuri Felshtinsky, “‘My name is Fedyashin, Anton Fedyashin.’ Who Is Anton Fedyashin and What Was He Teaching Maria Butina?,” Gordon, 21 September 2018, https://english.gordonua.com/news/exclusiveenglish/my-name-is-fedyashin-anton-fedyashin-who-is-anton-fedyashin-and-what-was-he-teaching-maria-butina-investigation-by-yuri-felshtinsky-342703.html (accessed 17 June 2020).
5 “Kontrrazvedka Chekhii zakryla delo ob ugroze otravleniia prazhskikh politikov,” Radio Svoboda, 13 June 2020, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30668588.html (accessed 17 June 2020); Georgii Kobaladze, “‘Vypolnial voliu Putina.’ Kto khotel ubit gruzinskogo zhurnalista?” Radio Svoboda, 16 June 2020, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30674132.html (accessed 17 June 2020).
6 Redden, “FBI Probing.” This text was updated at 6:00 p.m. EDT, on Wednesday, 23 October 2013. The Russian Embassy provided this statement in an email to Mother Jones.
7 Private conversation with an American scholar, 24 November 2019, the ASEEES Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA.
8 Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020), 9.
9 Rid, Active Measures, 11.
10 Rid, 11; on the rebirth of Cold War-style dictatorship and Putinism in Russia, see Walter Lacqueur, Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West, 1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015).
11 Edward Mickolus, The Counterintelligence Chronology: Spying By and Against the United States From the 1700s Through 2014 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2015), 74.
12 “‘Deception Was My Job’ or ‘Soviet Subversion of the Free World Press’ (complete interview of Yuri Bezmenov posted by Kevin Heine),” YouTube, 11 April 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jFfrWKHB1Gc (accessed 18 June 2020); see also Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New York, NY: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984), 2.
13 “‘Deception Was My Job.’”
14 “KGB Defector Yuri Bezmenov’s Warning to America,” YouTube, 1 February 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bX3EZCVj2XA (accessed 17 June 2020).
15 Olga Bertelsen, “The Writers and the Chekists’ Discourse about the Holodomor,” in Crossing Ethnic Boundaries: Cultural and Political Labyrinths of the Literati in Kharkiv, Ukraine in the 1960s–1970s (Lexington Books, forthcoming).
16 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): 291–305; Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91; Slavoj Žižek’s, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London, U.K.: Picador, 2008).
17 Olga Bertelsen, “A Trial in Absentia: Purifying National Historical Narratives in Russia,” Kyiv Mohyla Humanities Journal, no. 3 (2016): 73.
18 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London, U.K.: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 31.
19 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 31.
20 Huntington, 35.
21 E. I. Stepanov, ed., Konflikty v sovremennoi Rossii: Problemy analiza i regulirovaniia (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1999), 228. I am grateful to Victoria Malko for sharing this source with me.
22 On Russian genocide in Chechnya and responses to it in Russia and the West, see Anna Politkovskaya, A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya, trans. John Crowfoot (London: Harvill, 2001); Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002); Victoria A. Malko, The Chechen Wars: Responses in Russia and the United States (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015); Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s War: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 187–204; James Hughes, “The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?,” Demokratizatsiya 15, no. 3 (2007): 293–311; see also “Latvia: Latvian Parliament Member Accuses Russia of Genocide in Chechnya,” IPR Strategic Business Information Database/Business Insights: Essentials, 9 February 2000, https://bi-gale-com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/essentials/article/GALE%7CA59278837?u=embry&sid=summon (accessed 14 June 2020); and “Czech Republic: Czech President Accuses Russia of Genocide in Chechnya,” IPR Strategic Business Information Database/Business Insights: Essentials, 29 February 2000, https://bi-gale-com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/essentials/article/GALE%7CA59648000?u=embry&sid=summon (accessed 14 June 2020). In February 1999, Latvian parliamentary deputy Juris Vidins claimed that there were documents in his possession detailing Russia’s genocidal policies against Chechnya. These documents were signed by Russian Chief of Army General Staff Colonel-General Anatolii Kvashnin, ordering the “filtration of Chechens between the ages of 10 and 14” who were to be sent to Omsk for military training. The second document dated 15 December 1999 was a Russian Security Council report to then State Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev. This document ordered the destruction of mountain villages in Bamut, Itum-Kale, and Zandak Districts with the subsequent resettlement of inhabitants to northern regions of Chechnya or elsewhere in Russia. The Czech President Václav Havel shared Vidins’ claim, arguing that Russia’s operations in Chechnya should be identified as the “killing of a nation.” Gavel asserted that the Russian war in Chechnya had nothing to do with countermeasures against terrorism.
