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On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed; and the cavalry,²⁶⁵ to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn; the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own pila. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Cæsar, “that such men dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for their courage?” They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.

After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no hopes of safety, surrendered.²⁶⁶ In dwelling on the misfortune of their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar, to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence.²⁶⁷

Siege of the Oppidum of the Aduatuci.

VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones. He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above, were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.

As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii, they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and retired, with all they possessed, into one oppidum, remarkably fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated²⁶⁸ answers sufficiently to this description. (See Plate 11.)

On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was surrounded by a countervallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of 15,000 feet,²⁶⁹ with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their oppidum. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine, placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive. But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace, demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed, like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained quiet.

The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack. The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were sold publicly to the number of 53,000.²⁷⁰

Subjugation of Armorica by P. Crassus

IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome, the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings.²⁷¹

These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar, offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities where Crassus had been making war.²⁷² They were probably échelonnés in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.

Expedition of Galba into the Valais.

X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni (peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper Valais), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges, Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (Martigny). This town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (the Drance). Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (gæsa). Having to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus, the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain.[273] In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.[273a]

CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)

(Book III. of the “Commentaries.”)

WAR OF THE VENETI – VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI – SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE – MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII

Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples.

I. WHILE Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,²⁷³ M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean. The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be restored.

Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great: they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast; they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their oppida, and transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (See Plate 12.) They allied themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Scheldt,²⁷⁴ and demanded succour from the isle of Britain.²⁷⁵

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter, possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.²⁷⁶

War against the Veneti.

II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T. Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri, with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli, the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,²⁷⁷ who had arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,²⁷⁸ received the command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted. His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against the Veneti.²⁷⁹

We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine. Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain possession of the principal oppida where the inhabitants took refuge. Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for terraces (aggere ac molibus), and forming approaches towards the place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide; but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the oppidum, this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful in the attack.²⁸⁰

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded in taking several of these oppida. But all their labours were thrown away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they evacuated the oppidum, embarked with all their goods on board their numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring oppida, the situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner. Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (See Plate 12.)

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen, they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides, and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams (transtra), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen, or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support, with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the grappling-irons (copulæ).²⁸¹

Naval Combat against the Veneti.

III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was at length enabled to set sail.²⁸² It quitted the Loire, and directed its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (See Plate 12.) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped, which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean. Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops, which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly, the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,²⁸³ when, to remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in 492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks (falces) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses (non absimili forma muralium falcium).²⁸⁴ The falx was an iron with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which, suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without the means of defending any longer their oppida, they surrendered themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the insurrection.²⁸⁵

Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli.

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined, a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops. Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.²⁸⁶ (See Plate 13.) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti.²⁸⁷

Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.²⁸⁸ He believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (in convalle), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the oppidum of the Sotiates (the town of Sos), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus,²⁸⁹ supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called soldures, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the oppidum; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an oppidum fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy.²⁹⁰ He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.