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Learned historians have long had this subject under consideration; they have devoted themselves to the most profound researches, and to the most ingenious suppositions, still without arriving at a completely satisfactory result,⁸⁰⁴ which ought not to surprise us, inasmuch as Cicero himself found the question obscure.⁸⁰⁵

In virtue of a law of C. Sempronius Gracchus, named lex Sempronia, it had been decided that the Senate should designate, before the election of the consuls, the provinces they were to administer after quitting office. When Cæsar and Bibulus were elected, instead of provinces, the inspection of the public ways was given to them; but Cæsar, unwilling to suffer this affront, obtained, by a plebiscitum, on the motion of Vatinius, the government of Cisalpine Gaul for five years; the Senate added to it Transalpine Gaul, which then formed a separate province independent of the other.⁸⁰⁶ In 699, the law Trebonia prolonged, for five more years, Cæsar’s command in Gaul. This command was therefore to last ten years; and, since Cæsar only entered upon his proconsular functions at the beginning of the year 696, it seems natural to infer that these ten years should reach to the 1st of January, 706. We, nevertheless, see that, at the end of 704, the Senate regarded Cæsar’s power as at an end. We then ask, on what ground that assembly supported the pretence that the ten years devolved to the proconsul were completed at that date. We consider the following to be the explanation: —

It was in the month of March that, according to custom, the retiring consuls took possession of the government of provinces.⁸⁰⁷ It is, consequently, very probable that the law of Vatinius, published, as we have seen, in 695, was voted towards the latter days of the month of February in that same year, and that the proconsulship given to Cæsar was to begin from the day of the promulgation of that law. Nothing would have prevented him, indeed, from shortening the time of his magistracy, and seizing, before the termination of his curule functions, the military command or imperium, as Crassus did in 699, who started for Syria without waiting for the end of his consulship. Supposing, then, which is not impossible, that the whole year of Cæsar’s consulship was included in his proconsulship,⁸⁰⁸ the five first years of his command would date from 695, and end on the 1st of January, 700. The oration on the Consular Provinces proves that it was so understood. The time when it was pronounced (July or August, 698) was that of the assignment of the provinces destined for the consuls who were to quit office eighteen months after – that is, in 700 – and when the question of superseding Cæsar was agitated. The first quinquennium of his command terminated, therefore, in December, 699, and, consequently, the second in December, 704. Such was the system of the Senate, naturally much inclined to shorten the duration of the proconsulship of Gaul.⁸⁰⁹ Accordingly, Hirtius informs us that, in 703, the Gauls knew that Cæsar had but one summer, that of 704, to pass in Gaul.⁸¹⁰ Dio Cassius says similarly that Cæsar’s power was to end with the year 704.⁸¹¹ According to Appian, the Consul Claudius Marcellus proposed, at the beginning of 704, to name a successor to Cæsar, whose powers were on the eve of expiring.⁸¹² On the other hand, Cicero relates in one of his letters that Pompey seemed to be of the same opinion as the Senate, to require the return of the proconsul on the Ides of the November of 704. At the end of that same year, the great orator expresses, in the following terms, his own opinion on the subject of the claim raised by Cæsar to dispensation from coming to Rome to solicit the consulship: “What, then? must we have regard for a man who will keep his army after the day fixed by the law?”⁸¹³ Some time afterwards, apostrophising Cæsar in a letter to Atticus,⁸¹⁴ he exclaims: “You have kept, during ten years, a province of which you have procured the continuance, not by the sovereign will of the Senate, but by your intrigues and your acts of violence. You have overpassed the term fixed, by your ambition, and not by the law… You retain your army longer than the people has ordained and than it is the people’s will.” On another hand, a passage of Suetonius says, in a very formal manner, that Cæsar intended to offer himself as candidate in 705, to exercise the consulship in 706, when he would have completed the time of his proconsulship.⁸¹⁵ Lastly the Senate so evidently regards the beginning of the year 705 as the obligatory termination of Cæsar’s command, that, in the month of January, it declares him the enemy of the Republic, because he is still at the head of his soldiers, and decrees extreme measures against him.⁸¹⁶

But the dispute between the Senate and Cæsar did not turn upon the term of his command. Cæsar offered himself to the consular comitia of the year 705. A law, submitted to the people by the ten tribunes, and supported by Pompey and Cicero, had permitted him to solicit this charge, although absent.⁸¹⁷ This law would have been without object unless it had implied the authorisation for Cæsar to keep his army until the time of the consular elections. Certain authors even think that this right must have been formally reserved in the law. The “Epitome” of Titus Livius says, in fact, that, according to the law, he was to keep his command until the time of his second consulship.⁸¹⁸ On the other hand, Cicero writes to Atticus that the best argument for refusing Cæsar, in his absence, the power of soliciting the second consulship, is that, by granting it to him, they acknowledge in him, by the same act, the right of keeping his province and his army.⁸¹⁹ This advantage Cæsar calls beneficium populi;⁸²⁰ and when he complained that they were depriving him of six months of his command, he reckoned the time which had to pass between the 1st of January, 705, and the month of July, the period of the consular comitia.⁸²¹

Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then keep the imperium as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702, would end on the 1st of January, 707.⁸²² It was evident that he was unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the combination established by law, he remained consul till the 1st of January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.

In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party; the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, air the passions, all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future, are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.

Intrigues to deprive Cæsar of his Command.

VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful, though a simple proconsul, had, as we have said before, retired to Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going into Spain to govern his province.⁸²³ At the outset of revolutions, the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and enterprising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome; and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obliged to give an explanation, he promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation, he replied that “everybody ought equally to obey the Senate.”⁸²⁴ Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.

The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question frankly until they were convinced of Pompey’s consent to the recall of Cæsar.⁸²⁵ beforehand the consuls nominated for the following year, and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M. Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment, exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every day, even on those which were called comitiales, when any meeting of that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at the same time, to the Senate and to the people.⁸²⁶ This motion was adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a decision or an opinion of the Senate (senatus auctoritas). Four tribunes of the people interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius Pansa.

It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar’s command; the discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the minutes of the Senate the following decision: “The Senate will take into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient reasons for being restored to civil life.” C. Cœlius and C. Vibius Pansa renewed their opposition.⁸²⁷

Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar’s province before the Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further inconvenience in it. “What will be done,” asked one of the senators, “if the decision of the Senate be opposed?” – “It matters little,” replied Pompey, “whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people to intercede.” – “But,” said another, “if he seeks to be consul, and keep his army?” – Pompey only replied with great coolness, “If my son would beat me with a staff?..” He always, as we see, affected obscurity in his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.

The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and Pansa made opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of giving the provinces at its will.⁸²⁸ These different measures revealed sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.

Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. Cicero wrote in vain that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their place.⁸²⁹ They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East, either for Pompey or for Cæsar.⁸³⁰ Fortunately, the Parthians did not attack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as imperator.⁸³¹ From that time he took this title in the subscription of his letters.⁸³²

CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704

C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Æmilius Paulus, Consuls.

I. THE year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party, though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to the tribuneship was due to Pompey,⁸³³ he would distribute the lands of Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this property in favour of his veterans.⁸³⁴ This hope was vain; for already Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703 he could reckon on the Consul Sulpicius and the tribunes Pansa and Cœlius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If, subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.

Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues;⁸³⁵ but as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate, Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments to his character and his high qualities.⁸³⁶ Curio had acquired authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written a book,⁸³⁷ and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were repeated in Rome.⁸³⁸ Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.

From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute lives; their friendship had never changed.⁸³⁹ The relationship of Mark Antony with the Julia family,⁸⁴⁰ his connection with Gabinius, and, above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect of Cæsar to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial.⁸⁴¹ Cæsar employed him first as lieutenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to soften Curio’s temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents.⁸⁴² It is true that, at the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus, without requiring more than his neutrality.⁸⁴³ We can hardly understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome;⁸⁴⁴ to cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia, in Italy, a magnificent villa;⁸⁴⁵ to send rich presents to distant towns – such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money enough from a province exhausted by eight years’ war? The immensity of his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to 40,000,000 sestertii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sestertii from the captives sold after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that their number amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sestertii a head. Now, in spite of Cæsar’s generosity in often restoring the captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that 500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about 500,000,000 sestertii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money which forms the advance for the costs.

The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar was at first kept secret; but, whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people. Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order, probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which agitated the Senate and the town.⁸⁴⁶ His character of pontiff rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable utility,⁸⁴⁷ it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate’s refusal as an offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition.⁸⁴⁸ Towards the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alimentation of the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles;⁸⁴⁹ the other, on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during five years.⁸⁵⁰ He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his popularity.⁸⁵¹ These last two projects were as ill received as the first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those against whom he had hitherto contended.

The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law, accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence; the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying excessive severity. He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness.⁸⁵²

Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails.⁸⁵³ Instead of remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral force it has lost.

Cæsar repairs to the Cisalpine.

II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (Arras). “At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy, in order,” says Hirtius, “to recommend to the municipal towns and colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood. Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar’s power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them for their favourable feeling towards Antony. He sought also to secure their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason that he was Cæsar’s friend and lieutenant.

“Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each other in zeal.” Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph earnestly desired.⁸⁵⁴

After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions, who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youngest soldiers reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, “only moving the troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers’ health. T. Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of securing more votes for Cæsar’s approaching candidateship for the office of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœvres of his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the conscript fathers would do him justice.”⁸⁵⁵ In fact, whenever the Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority pronounced in favour of Cæsar.

It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless, there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a struggle for life: Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his opposition.⁸⁵⁶

When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul’s prudence, approved much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable to see Pompey disband his. “Those great generals,” said he, “were objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the Republic until both of them should become private men.”⁸⁵⁷ This speech pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers over him “like an athlete,” says Appian, “who had just sustained a severe and dangerous combat.”⁸⁵⁸

The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar: “The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army nor his province.”⁸⁵⁹ Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate have its way.

He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality, taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar. At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting the term fixed by the law.⁸⁶⁰ This letter, studied and artful, was intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio baffled this manœuvre. “If Pompey were sincere,” he said, “he ought not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power.”⁸⁶¹ This accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen years – that is to say, since 684, the time of his first consulship – Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the imperium, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the victualling of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch, “and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it.”⁸⁶²

Pompey receives Ovations, and asks Cæsar to return his Two Legions.

III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill, and on his recovery the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that “every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the procession which followed him in his progress offered the most agreeable and most magnificent spectacle.”⁸⁶³ Although these ovations had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar’s power. Thus, taking for pretext the demands for re-enforcements renewed incessantly by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the defence of the threatened provinces. A senatus-consultus at once summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul; but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the re-enforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers, who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225 francs) to be distributed to each legionary.⁸⁶⁴