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Of the nine legions remaining with Cæsar, three were sent with T. Labienus to the north towards the ocean, into the part of the country of the Eburones which touched on that of the Menapii; three to the south with C. Trebonius, to ravage the districts neighbouring on the Aduatuci (towards the south-west, between the Meuse and the Demer); lastly, Cæsar, at the head of the three others, advanced towards the Scheldt, the waters of which, at this period, mingled with those of the Meuse.454 (See Plate 14.) It was his intention to gain the extremity of the Ardennes (between Brussels and Antwerp), whither it was said that Ambiorix had retired with a few horsemen. He announced, on his departure, that he should return to Aduatuca on the seventh day, the period for the distribution of provisions to the legion which was left at that place in charge of the baggage. Labienus and Trebonius were, if they found it possible, to return at the same period, in order to concert again on the measures to be taken after they had made themselves acquainted with the designs of the enemy.
The Eburones had neither regular force, nor garrison, nor oppidum. They formed a scattered multitude, always in ambush, attacking the soldiers when isolated, and obliging the Romans to carry on a harassing war, without any decisive result; for the nature of the country, covered with thick forests, and intersected by marshes, protected the barbarians, who could only be reached by small detachments. In the midst of these difficulties, Cæsar preferred doing less injury to the enemy, and sparing the lives of his own soldiers, by having recourse to the Gauls. He accordingly sent messages to invite the neighbouring peoples to come and ravage the territory of the Eburones, and assist him in exterminating a race guilty of having slaughtered his soldiers. At his call, numerous hordes rushed from all sides, and the entire territory of the Eburones was soon given up to pillage.455
The Sicambri attack Aduatuca.
VII. Meanwhile, the seventh day, the period fixed for Cæsar’s return, approached. Chance, so common in war, brought about a remarkable incident. The enemy, scattered, and struck with terror, could no longer inspire the least fear. But rumour having spread beyond the Rhine, among the Germans, that all peoples were invited to ravage the country of the Eburones, the Sicambri, neighbours to the river, who had, as we have seen, received the Usipetes and Tencteri after their defeat, collect 2,000 cavalry; they pass the Rhine on rafts and boats, thirty miles below where Cæsar had built his bridge and left a guard (forty-five kilomètres below Bonn.)456 They invade the territory of the Eburones, pick up a crowd of fugitives, and seize upon a great number of cattle. The attraction of booty draws them on farther and farther; bred in the midst of war and plundering, nothing stops them – neither marshes nor woods. On their arrival at some distance from the Meuse, they learn from prisoners the absence of Cæsar and the distance of the army, and that in three hours they can reach Aduatuca, where the riches of the Romans are deposited. They are made to believe that this fortress is defended by a garrison too weak to line the walls or venture to issue from the retrenchments. Trusting in this information, the Germans hide their booty, and, guided by a prisoner, march against Aduatuca, crossing the Meuse at Maestricht.
Hitherto, Cicero had scrupulously executed Cæsar’s order, and retained the troops in the camp without even permitting a single valet to quit it; but on the seventh day, reckoning no longer on the return of the general at the term fixed, he yielded to the complaints of the soldiers, who blamed his obstinacy in keeping them shut up as though they were besieged. He believed, moreover, that the nine legions, and the numerous cavalry which scoured the country, permitted him to venture without danger to a distance of three miles from his camp, especially after the dispersion of the enemy’s forces; he therefore sent five cohorts to cut wheat in the nearest fields, situated to the north of Aduatuca, and separated from the camp only by a hill. With them went, under the same ensign, 300 men of different legions left sick, but then restored, and a multitude of valets, taking with them a great number of beasts of burden, which were in the camp.
Suddenly the German cavalry arrive; their march had been concealed by the woods. Without halting, they rush toward the Decuman gate, and attempt to enter the camp. (See Plate 18.) The attack is so sudden, that the merchants established under the vallum have not time to enter. The soldiers, taken by surprise, are in confusion; the cohort on guard struggles to prevent the enemy from entering the gate. The Sicambri spread themselves round the camp, to discover another passage; but, fortunately, the nature of the locality and the retrenchments render access impossible everywhere but at the gates. They attempt to force an entry there, and are prevented with difficulty. The alarm and disorder are at their height. The soldiers are uncertain where to direct their steps, or where to assemble; some pretend that the camp is taken, others that the army and Cæsar have perished. A feeling of superstitious anxiety recalls to their minds the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, slain at the same place. At the sight of such a general consternation, the barbarians are confirmed in their opinion that the Romans are too few to resist; they strive to force an entrance, and urge one another not to let so rich a prey escape.
Among the sick left in the camp was the primipilus P. Sextius Baculus, who had signalised himself in the preceding combats. For five days he had taken no food. Uneasy for the safety of all, as well as his own, he leaves his tent without arms, sees before him the enemy and the danger, snatches a sword from the first man he meets, and takes his post at a gate. The centurions of the cohort on guard follow him, and all together sustain the attack for a few instants. Baculus, grievously wounded, faints. He is passed from hand to hand, and only saved with difficulty. This incident gives the others time to recover their courage. They remain on the rampart, and present at least some appearance of defence.
At this moment the soldiers who had gone out to reap were on their way back to the camp; they are struck with the cries they hear; the cavalry press forward, perceive the imminence of the danger, and see, with terror, that it is no longer possible to obtain refuge behind the retrenchments. The newly-levied soldiers, inexperienced in war, interrogate the tribune and centurions with their looks, and wait their orders. There is no one so brave as not to be agitated by so unexpected an event. The Sicambri, perceiving the ensigns at a distance, believe at first that the legions were returning, and cease from the attack; but soon, filled with contempt for such a handful of men, they rush upon them on all sides.
The valets take refuge on a neighbouring hill, that on which now stands the village of Berg. Driven from this post, they rush back into the midst of the ensigns and manipuli, and increase the fear of the already intimidated men. Among the soldiers, some propose to form in wedge, in order to open themselves a way to the camp they see so near them: the loss of a small number will be the safety of all. Others advise to remain firm on the heights, and run the same chance together. This latter opinion is not that of the old soldiers, united under the same ensign. Led by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, they fight their way through the enemy, and re-enter the camp without the loss of a single man. Under protection of this bold movement, the valets and cavalry succeed in following them. As to the young soldiers who had posted themselves on the heights, they were not able, in their inexperience, either to maintain their resolution to defend themselves in their position, or to imitate the successful energy of the veterans; they engaged on disadvantageous ground in an attempt to regain the camp, and their destruction would have been certain but for the devotedness of the centurions. Some had been promoted from the lowest ranks of the army to this grade, in reward for their courage; and for a moment they intimidated the enemy, by sacrificing their lives in order to justify their renown. This heroic act, contrary to all expectation, enabled three cohorts to re-enter the camp; the two others perished.
During these combats, the defenders of the camp had recovered from their first alarm. When they saw them stationed on the rampart, the Germans despaired of being able to force the retrenchments; they withdrew, and repassed the Rhine with their booty. The terror they had spread was such that, even after their retreat, when, the following night, C. Volusenus arrived at Aduatuca with the cavalry which preceded the legions, the return of Cæsar and the safety of the army seemed hardly credible. Men’s minds were affected to such a degree that they supposed the cavalry alone had escaped from the disaster; for, they said, the Germans would never have attacked the camp if the legions had not been defeated. The arrival of Cæsar alone dissipated all their fears.
Accustomed to the various chances of war, and to events which must be supported without complaining, he uttered no reproach;457 he merely reminded them that they should not have run the least risk by letting the troops go out of the camp; that, moreover, if they might blame fortune for the sudden attack of the enemy, they might, on the other hand, congratulate themselves on having driven them back from the gates of the camp. He was astonished, nevertheless, that the Germans, having crossed the Rhine for the purpose of ravaging the territory of the Eburones, should have acted so as to render the most signal service to Ambiorix, by coming to attack the Romans.
Cæsar, to complete the ruin of the Eburones, marched again, collected a great number of pillagers from the neighbouring states, and sent them in different directions in pursuit of the enemy, to plunder and burn everything. Their villages and habitations became, without exception, a prey to the flames. The cavalry scoured the country in all directions, in the hope of overtaking Ambiorix; the prospect of seizing him, and gaining thereby the gratitude of the general, made them support infinite fatigues, almost beyond human endurance. At every moment they believed they were on the point of seizing the fugitive, and continually the thick forests or deep retreats hid him from their pursuit. At last, under protection of night, he reached other regions, escorted by four horsemen, the only friends left to whom he dared trust his life. Ambiorix escaped, but the massacre of the legion of Sabinus was cruelly avenged by the devastation of the country of the Eburones!
After this expedition, Cæsar led back to Durocortorum (Rheims), the chief town of the Remi, the army diminished by the two cohorts lost at Aduatuca. He there convoked the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to be passed on the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, the chief of the revolt, was condemned to death, and executed according to the old Roman custom. Some others, fearing the same fate, took flight. They were forbidden fire and water (that is, they were condemned to exile). Cæsar sent two legions to winter quarters on the frontier of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, and the six others among the Senones, at Agedincum (Sens). After providing for the provisionment of the army, he proceeded into Italy.458
CHAPTER X.
(Year of Rome 702.)
(Book VII. of the “Commentaries.”)
REVOLT OF GAUL – CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM – SIEGES OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA – CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE PARISII – SIEGE OF ALESIA
Revolt of Gaul.
I. THE Roman arms had in six years subjugated, one after another, the principal states of Gaul. Belgium, Aquitaine, and the countries on the sea-coast, had been the theatre of the most desperate struggles. The inhabitants of the isle of Britain, like the Germans, had become prudent by the defeats they had suffered. Cæsar had just taken a signal vengeance upon the revolted Eburones, and thought that he might without danger leave his army and proceed into Italy, to hold the assemblies. During his abode in this part of his command, the murder of P. Clodius took place (the 13th of the Calends of February, 30th of December, 701), which caused a great agitation, and gave rise to the Senatus-consultus, which ordered all the youths of Italy to take the military oath; Cæsar took advantage of it to make levies also in the Province. The rumours of what was taking place at Rome soon passed the Alps, to revive the resentments and hopes of the Gauls; they believed that the domestic troubles would detain Cæsar in Italy, and would give rise to a favourable opportunity for a new insurrection.
The principal chiefs meet in secluded spots; mutually excite each other by the recital of their grievances, and by the remembrance of the death of Acco; promise great rewards to those who, at the peril of their lives, will commence the war; but decide that, before all, the return of Cæsar to his army must be rendered impossible, a project the execution of which was so much the easier, since the legions would not dare to leave their winter quarters in the absence of their general, and since the general himself could not join them without a sufficient escort.
The Carnutes are the first to offer to take arms: as the necessity of acting secretly did not allow them to exchange hostages, they exact as security an oath of alliance. This oath is taken by all the ensigns in a meeting in which the moment for the rising is fixed.
On the day appointed, the Carnutes, led by two resolute men, Cotuatus and Conetodunus, rush to Genabum (Gien), plunder and slaughter the Roman merchants, amongst others the knight C. Fusius Cita, charged by Cæsar with the victualling department. These news reached every state in Gaul with an extreme celerity, according to the custom of the Gauls of communicating remarkable events by cries transmitted from neighbour to neighbour across the country.459 Thus what had happened at Genabum at sunrise, was known by the Arverni before the end of the first watch (towards eight o’clock at night), at a distance of 160 miles.
Vercingetorix, a young Arvernan who possessed great influence in his country,460 and whose father, Celtillus, for a time chief of all Gaul, had been put to death by his countrymen for having aspired to the royalty, calls his clients together, and excites their zeal. Expelled from Gergovia by those who were unwilling to tempt fortune with him, he raises the country, and, with the help of a numerous band, retakes the town, and causes himself to be proclaimed king. Soon he seduces the Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the Aulerci, the Lemovices of Armorica, the Andes, and the other peoples who dwell on the shores of the ocean. The commandment is given to him by unanimous consent. He exacts hostages from those peoples, orders a prompt levy of soldiers, fixes the number of men and arms which each country is to furnish in a given time, and occupies himself especially with the raising of the cavalry. Active, daring, severe, and inflexible even to cruelty, he subjects to the most atrocious tortures those who hesitate, and by these means of terror soon forms an army.
He sent a part of it to the Ruteni, under the command of Cadurcus Lucterius, a man full of daring; and to draw the Bituriges into the insurrection, he invaded their territory. By acting thus, he threatened the Province, and protected his rear whilst he moved towards the north, where the Roman occupation was concentrated. On his approach, the Bituriges solicited the help of the Ædui, their allies. The last, by the advice of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who had remained with the army, sent them a body of cavalry and infantry to support them against Vercingetorix; but, when they reached the Loire, which separated the territory of the two peoples, these auxiliary troops halted for some days, and then returned, without having dared to cross the river, pretending that they had been betrayed by the Bituriges. Immediately after their departure, the latter joined the Arverni.461
Cæsar begins the Campaign.
II. Cæsar heard of these events in Italy, and, reassured on the troubles in Rome, which had been appeased by the firmness of Pompey, he took his departure from Transalpine Gaul. When he arrived on the other side of the Alps (perhaps on the banks of the Rhone), he was struck with the difficulties which lay in the way of his joining the army. If he sent for the legions into the Roman province, they would be compelled, on their way, to fight without him; if, on the other hand, he would go to them, he was obliged to pass through populations to whom, notwithstanding their apparent tranquillity, it would have been imprudent to trust his person.
While Cæsar found so great difficulties before him, Lucterius,462 who had been sent by Vercingetorix to the Ruteni, brings them over to the alliance with the Arverni, advances towards the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, from whom he receives hostages, and, at the head of a numerous army, threatens the Province in the direction of Narbonne. These events made Cæsar resolve to proceed to that town. His arrival put an end to people’s fears. He placed garrisons among the peoples who bordered on the territory of the enemy, the Ruteni of the left bank of the Tarn (Ruteni provinciales), the Volcæ Arecomici, the Tolosates, and near Narbonne. At the same time, he ordered a part of the troops of the province, and the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy, to unite on the territory of the Helvi, which bordered upon that of the Arverni.463 Intimidated by these dispositions, Lucterius did not venture to engage himself in the midst of these garrisons, and retired.
This first danger averted, it was important for Cæsar to prevent Vercingetorix from raising other peoples, who might perhaps be inclined to follow the example of the Bituriges. By invading the country of the Arverni, Cæsar might hope to draw the Gaulish chief into his own country, and thus remove him from those where the legions were wintering. He proceeded, therefore, to the country of the Helvi, where he joined the troops who had just concentrated there. The mountains of the Cévennes, which separated this people from the Arverni, were covered with six feet of snow; the soldiers opened a passage by dint of labour. Advancing by Aps and Saint-Cirgues, between the sources of the Loire and the Allier (see Plate 19), Cæsar debouched on Le Puy and Brioude. The Arverni, at this season, the most rigorous of the year, believed themselves defended by the Cévennes, as by an insurmountable wall: he fell upon them unexpectedly, and, in order to spread still greater terror, he caused the cavalry to scour the country far around.
Quickly informed of this march, Vercingetorix, at the prayer of the Arverni, who implored his succour, abandoned the country of the Bituriges. Cæsar had foreseen this; so he only remains two days amongst the Arverni, and, quitting them under the pretext of increasing his forces, he leaves the command to young Brutus, whom he enjoins to throw out his reconnoitring parties to as great a distance as possible, and promises to return at the end of three days. Having by this diversion drawn Vercingetorix southward, he proceeds in great haste to Vienne, arrives there unexpectedly, takes the newly-raised cavalry which he had sent thither, marches night and day, crosses the country of the Ædui, and directs his march towards the Lingones, where two legions were in winter quarters. By this extreme rapidity he seeks to prevent any evil design on the part of the Ædui. Scarcely has he arrived amongst the Lingones, when he sends orders to the other legions, two of which were on the frontiers of the Treviri, and the six others in the country of the Senones, to concentrate the whole army at Agedincum (Sens) before his march is known to the Arverni. As soon as Vercingetorix was informed of this movement, he returned with his army to the country of the Bituriges, and thence started to lay siege to Gorgobina (Saint-Parize-le-Châtel), an oppidum of the Boii, who had settled, after the defeat of the Helvetii, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire.464
Taking of Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum.
III. Although Cæsar had succeeded in uniting his troops, and in placing himself at their head, he found it still difficult to fix upon a determined plan. If he opened the campaign too early, the army might run short of provisions through the difficulty of transport. If, on the other hand, during the rest of the winter,465 his army, remaining inactive, allowed Vercingetorix to take Gorgobina, a place tributary to the Ædui, the example might discourage his allies and lead to the defection of the whole of Gaul. Rather than undergo such an affront, he resolved to brave all obstacles. He engaged the Ædui, therefore, to furnish provisions, announced his speedy arrival to the Boii, recommended them to remain faithful, and to offer an energetic resistance; and then, leaving at Agedincum two legions and the baggage of the whole army, he marched with the eight others towards the territory of the Boii. On the second day466 he arrived at Vellaunodunum (Triguères), a town of the Senones, and prepared to lay siege to it, in order to protect his rear and secure his supply of provisions. (See Plate 19.) The countervallation was finished in two days. On the third, the town offered to surrender: the capitulation was only accepted on condition of delivering up the arms, the beasts of burden, and 600 hostages. Cæsar left C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, to see the convention executed, and marched in haste towards Genabum (Gien), a town of the Carnutes.467 He arrived there in two days, and sufficiently early to surprise the inhabitants, who, thinking that the siege of Vellaunodunum would last longer, had not yet assembled sufficient troops for the defence of the place. The Roman army took its position before the oppidum; but the approach of night made it necessary to postpone the attack until the following morning. However, as Genabum had a bridge on the Loire adjoining to the town, Cæsar kept two legions under arms to watch it, in the fear that the besieged might escape during the night. And, in fact, towards midnight they silently issued from Genabum and began to pass the river. Cæsar, informed by his scouts, set fire to the gates, introduced the legions he had kept in reserve, and took possession of the place. The fugitives, who were closely crowded together at the issues of the town, and at the entrance of the bridge, which were too narrow to allow them to pass, fell nearly all into the hands of the Romans. Genabum was plundered and burnt, and the spoil abandoned to the soldiers. Then the army passed the Loire, arrived on the territory of the Bituriges, and continued its march.
The town of Noviodunum (Sancerre), belonging to this latter people, lay in Cæsar’s route; he undertook to lay siege to it. The inhabitants were already hastening to make their submission, and a part of the hostages had been delivered, when they saw in the distance the cavalry of Vercingetorix, who, warned of the approach of the Romans, had raised the siege of Gorgobina, and marched to meet them. At this sight, the besieged, mustering courage again, seize their arms, shut their gates, and man the wall. The Roman cavalry was immediately sent to meet the enemy; staggered at the first shock, it was on the point of giving way; but soon, supported by about 400 German cavalry, in Cæsar’s pay since the commencement of the campaign, they entirely routed the Gauls. This defeat having again spread terror in the town, the inhabitants delivered up the instigators of the revolt, and surrendered. Cæsar marched thence, through the fertile territory of the Biturges, towards Avaricum (Bourges), the largest and strongest oppidum of that people. The taking of this town, he considered, would render him master of the whole country.468
Siege of Avaricum.
IV. Vercingetorix, after having experienced so many reverses successively at Vellaunodunum, at Genabum, and at Noviodunum, convokes a council, in which he explains the necessity of adopting a new system of warfare. Above all, according to him, they must take advantage of the season, and of the numerous Gaulish cavalry, to cut off the Romans from provisions and forage, sacrifice private interest to the common welfare, set fire to the habitations, burgs, and oppida which they could not defend, so as to spread desolation from the territory of the Boii as far as the enemy could extend his incursions. If that be an extreme sacrifice, it is nothing in comparison with death and slavery.
This advice having been unanimously approved, the Bituriges, in one single day, set fire to more than twenty towns; the neighbouring countries follow their example. The hope of a speedy victory made them support this painful sight with resignation. They deliberated whether Avaricum should not undergo the same fate; the Bituriges implored them to spare one of the most beautiful towns in Gaul, the ornament and bulwark of their country; “the defence of it will be easy,” they added, “on account of its almost inaccessible position.” Vercingetorix, at first of a contrary opinion, ended by giving way to this general feeling of compassion, entrusted the place to men capable of defending it, and, following Cæsar by short marches, pitched his camp in a spot defended by woods and marshes, sixteen miles from Avaricum469 (two kilomètres to the north of Dun-le-Roy, at the confluence of the Auron and the Taisseau).
Avaricum was situated, as Bourges is at present, at the extremity of a piece of ground surrounded, to the north and west, by several marshy streams: the Yèvre, the Yévrette, and the Auron. (See Plate 20.) The Gaulish town, adorned with public places, and enclosing 40,000 souls, exceeded, no doubt, in extent the Gallo-Roman circuit. The aspect of the locality is certainly no longer the same: the marshes have been dried, and the courses of water reduced within regular limits; the ruins accumulated so many centuries ago have raised the level of the ground on many points. To the south of Bourges, at a distance of 700 mètres, the ground forms a neck, which, in the time of Cæsar’s wars, was narrower than at present; it inclined more towards the place, and presented, at 80 mètres from the walls, a sudden depression, resembling a vast fosse. (See the section along C D.) The slopes, then, abrupt towards the Yévrette and the Auron, defined more clearly the only and very narrow avenue (unum et perangustum aditum) which gave access to the town.470
Cæsar established his camp behind this tongue of land, to the south, and at 700 mètres from Avaricum, between the Auron and the Yévrette. As the nature of the locality prevented all countervallation, he took his dispositions for a regular siege. The place was only open to attack towards that part of the enclosure which faced the avenue, on a width of from 300 to 400 Roman feet (about 100 mètres). In this place the summit of the walls commanded by about 80 feet (twenty-four mètres) the ground situated in advance.471 Cæsar commanded a terrace to be commenced, covered galleries to be pushed towards the oppidum, and two towers to be constructed.
During the execution of these works, trusty messengers informed Vercingetorix every moment of what was going on in Avaricum, and carried back his orders. The besiegers were watched when they went to forage, and, notwithstanding their precaution to choose every day different hours and roads, they could not move any distance from the camp without being attacked.
The Romans incessantly demanded provisions from the Ædui and the Boii; but the first showed little haste to send them, and the latter, poor and weak, had exhausted their resources; moreover, their country had just been laid waste by fire. Although, during several days, the troops, deprived of corn, lived only on cattle which had been brought from afar, yet they uttered no complaint unworthy of the Roman name and of their preceding victories. When, visiting the works, Cæsar addressed by turn each of the legions, and offered to the soldiers to raise the siege if they felt their privations too rigorous, they unanimously called upon him to persevere: “they had learned,” they said, “after so many years that they served under his command, never to suffer anything that was humiliating, and to leave nothing unfinished.” They renewed this protest to the centurions and to the tribunes.
The towers already approached the walls, when prisoners informed Cæsar that Vercingetorix, from want of forage, had quitted his camp, leaving in it the mass of his army, and had advanced nearer to Avaricum with his cavalry and light infantry, with the intention of laying an ambush on the spot where he expected that the Romans would go to forage the following day.472 Upon this information, Cæsar, seeking to take advantage of the absence of Vercingetorix, started silently in the middle of the night, and came in the morning near the camp of the enemies. As soon as they were acquainted with his march, they hid their baggage and wagons in the forests, and drew up their troops on an open height. Cæsar immediately ordered his soldiers to lay down their bundles in one spot, and to keep their arms ready for combat.
The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle. With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same day he led them back to the siege operations.
It is evident that criers had been posted beforehand from Genabum to Gergovia, since it was agreed that the Carnutes should give the signal of war. It is exactly 160 miles (about 240 kilomètres), through the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, from Gien to Gergovia, the principal oppidum of the Arverni.
Thus Cicero gives it this sense in his Philippica Prima, § 13, where he reminds us of the conduct of Antony after the death of Cæsar. Antony had begun by treating with the conspirators who had taken refuge in the Capitol, and, at a sitting of the Senate, which he called together ad hoc, on the day of the Liberalia, that is to say, the 16th of the Calends of April, an amnesty was pronounced in favour of the murderers of Cæsar. Cicero, speaking of this session of the Senate, says, Proximo, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus, &c. Is it not evident that here altero die signifies the second day which followed the session of the Senate, or two days after that session?
Here are other examples which show that the word alter must be taken in the sense of secundus. Virgil says (Eclogue VIII., line 39), Alter ab undecimo tum jam me ceperat annus, which must be translated, I was thirteen years old. Servius, who composed a commentary on Virgil at a time when the traditions were still preserved, makes the following comment on this verse: Id est tertius decimus. Alter enim de duobus dicimus ut unus ab undecimo sit duodecimus, alter tertius decimus, et vult significare jam se vicinum fuisse pubertati, quod de duodecimo anno procedere non potest. (Virgil, edit. Burmann, tom. I., p. 130.)
Forcellini peremptorily establishes that vicesimo altero signifies the twenty-second; legio altera vicesima means the twenty-second legion.
The “Commentaries” inform us (De Bello Civili, III. 9) that Octavius, when besieging Salona, had established five camps round the town, and that the besieged took those five camps one after the other. The text is thus expressed: Ipsi in proxima Octavii castra irruperunt. Mis expugnatis, eodem impetu, altera sunt adorti; inde tertia et quarta, et deinceps reliqua. (See also De Bello Civili, III. 83.)
In the “Commentaries” we find sixty-three times the expression postero die, thirty-six times proximo die, ten times insequenti die, eleven times postridie ejus diei, or pridie ejus diei. The expression altero die is used only twice in the eight books De Bello Gallico, viz., lib. VII. cc. 11 and 68, and three times in De Bello Civili, lib. III. cc. 19, 26, and 30. Is that coincidence alone not sufficient to make us suppose that altero die ought not to be confounded with the preceding expressions; and does it not appear certain that, if Cæsar had arrived at Vellaunodunum the morning after his departure from Agedincum, he would have written, Postero die (or proximo die) quum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset, &c.?
We believe, therefore, that we are authorized in concluding that Cæsar arrived at Vellaunodunum the second day after the army moved.
Farther on, on page 339, will be found a new confirmation of the sense which we give to altero die. It results from the appreciation of the distance which separates Alesia from the battle-field where Cæsar defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix. (See the opinions of the commentators on altero die in the sixth volume of Cicero, edit. Lemaire, Classiques Latins, Excursus ad Philippicam primam.)
As Cæsar’s object, on quitting Sens, was to march as quickly as possible to the oppidum of the Boii, in order to raise the siege, since he starts without baggage, so as to be less impeded in his march, we will first examine the probable position of this latter town, before discussing the question relating to the intermediate points.
Gorgobina Boiorum. After the defeat of the Helvetii, Cæsar allowed the Ædui to receive the Boii upon their territory, and it is probable that they were established on the western frontier, as in an advanced post against the Arverni and the Bituriges. Several data confirm this opinion. Tacitus (Histor., II. 61) relates that: Mariccus quidam, e plebe Boiorum… concitis octo millibus hominum, proximos Æduorum pagos trahebat. The possessions of the Boii were, therefore, contiguous to the Æduan territory. Pliny the Elder (Hist. Nat., IV. 18) places the Boii in the number of the nations who inhabited the centre of the Lyonnaise. Intus autem Ædui fœderati, Carnuti fœderati, Boii, Senones… The place here occupied by the word Boii shows us again that this people was not far from the Ædui, the Senones, and the Carnutes. Lastly, the text of the “Commentaries” represents Vercingetorix as obliged to traverse the country of the Bituriges to repair to Gorgobina. The most plausible opinion is that which places the Boii between the Loire and the Allier, towards the confluence of these two rivers. This was already an old tradition, adopted in the fifteenth century by Raimondus Marlianus, one of the first editors of Cæsar. This space of ground, covered in its eastern part with woods and marshes, was admirably suited by its extent to the limited population of the Boii, who did not number more than 20,000 souls. Neither Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, marked on the map of Gaul as Gorgobina, nor La Guerche, proposed by General de Gœler, answer completely, by their topographical position, to the site of a Gaulish oppidum. In fact, Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier is far from being advantageously situated; this village stands at the foot of the hills which border the right bank of the Allier. La-Guerche-sur-Aubois fulfils no better the conditions of defence which must be required in the principal town of the Boii: it is situated almost in a plain, on the edge of a marshy valley of the Aubois. It presents a few remains of fortifications of the Middle Ages, but not a trace of more remote antiquity has been discovered in it. To seek Gorgobina farther down, and on the left bank of the Loire, is impossible, since, according to Cæsar, the Boii had been established on the territory of the Ædui, and the Loire formed the boundary between the Ædui and the Bituriges. If we are reduced to conjectures, we must at least admit as incontestable what is advanced by Cæsar.
The village of Saint-Parize-le-Châtel suits better. It is about eight kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, nearly in the middle of the space comprised between the Loire and the Allier; it occupies the centre of ancient agglomeration of inhabitants, which Guy Coquille, at the end of the sixteenth century, designates under the name of the bourg de Gentily, and which the chronicles called, down to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Pagus Gentilicus, or bourg des gentils. The history of this people has this remarkable peculiarity, that, whilst all the neighbouring nations on the other side of the Allier and the Loire had, as early as the fourth century, accepted the Christian religion, they alone continued in idolatry until the sixth century. Does this fact apply to a tribe settled in a foreign country, as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a longer time unchanged? An ancient tradition states that, in the environs of Saint-Parize, there was, at a very remote period, a considerable town, which was destroyed by a fire. A few scattered foundations, discovered in the woods of Bord, to the south-west of Saint Parize, seem to indicate the site of the oppidum of the Boii. The name of the castle, of the domain, and of the place called Les Bruyères de Buy, remind us of that of the Boii.
There was probably a Roman station at Saincaise-Meauce (thirteen kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier), on the right bank of the Allier. In 1861, there were discovered there numerous objects of the Gallo-Roman period, and two busts in white marble, life-size, representing Roman emperors. At Chantenay, eight kilomètres south from Saint-Pierre, a few Roman foundations have been found, and a considerable number of Gaulish coins, one of which, amongst others, bears the name of the Æduan Litavicus.
Genabum. The position of Gorgobina once established at the confluence of the Loire and the Allier, we must admit Gien as the ancient Genabum, and not Orleans, for the following reasons: —
1st. We cannot believe that Cæsar, leaving Sens in spite of the rigour of the season, and in haste to raise the siege of Gorgobina, should, without any reason, have taken a circuitous road of seventy-five kilomètres, which would represent three or four days march, in order to pass by Orleans. In fact, the distance from Sens to the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, is, by Orleans, 270 kilomètres, whilst it is only 180 kilomètres by the way of Gien.
2nd. From Sens to Gien the road was short and easy; on the contrary, from Sens to Orleans it was necessary to pass the great marsh of Sceaux and the forest of Orleans, probably impracticable. Now, the road indicated on the Peutingerian Table, as leading from Orleans to Sens, must have had a decided curve towards the south, and passed close by Gien, after having passed through Aquæ-Segeste (Craon and Chenevière), for the distance between Sens and Orleans is marked at fifty-nine Gaulish leagues, or 134 kilomètres. The Roman road, which leads directly from Sens to Orleans, by way of Sceaux, and which the itineraries do not mention, has only a length of 110 kilomètres: it is certainly less ancient than the former, and can never have been a Gaulish road.
3rd. The “Commentaries” inform us that the news of the insurrection of Genabum arrived in a short time among the Averni (of whom Gergovia, near Clermont, was the principal centre), at a distance of 160 miles (237 kilomètres) from Genabum. Now, the distance from Gien to Gergovia, by the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, is 240 kilomètres, which agrees with the text, whilst from Orleans to the same spot it is 300 kilomètres.
4th. After having crossed the Loire at Genabum, Cæsar was in the territory of the Bituriges. This is true if he passed by Gien, and false if he passed by Orleans, since, opposite Orleans, the left bank belonged to the territory of the Carnutes. It is true that it has been pretended that Gien belonged to the ancient diocese of Auxerre, and that, consequently, it was in the territory of the Senones, and not in that of the Carnutes. The limits of the ancient dioceses cannot be considered as indicating in an absolute manner the frontiers of the peoples of Gaul; and we cannot admit that the territory of the Senones formed an acute angle upon the territory of the Carnutes, the summit of which would be occupied by Gien. Moreover, whatever change it may have experienced in feudal times, in regard to its diocesan attribution, Gien has never formed a part of the Orléanais, in its civil and political relations. In 561, Gien was included in the kingdom of Orleans and Burgundy.
We believe, therefore, that Genabum was, not old Gien, which, notwithstanding its epithet, may be posterior to Cæsar, but the present Gien. This little town, by its position on the banks of the Loire, besides containing a hill very appropriate for the site of an ancient oppidum, possesses sufficiently interesting ruins, and agrees much better than Old Gien with the oppidum of the Carnutes. Without attaching too great faith to traditions and etymologies, we must, nevertheless, mention a gate at Gien, which, from time immemorial, has been called Cæsar’s Gate (la Porte de César); a street called à la Genabye, which leads, not towards Orleans, but towards the high part of town; a piece of ground, situated to the north of Gien, at the angle formed by the road to Montargis and the Roman road, at a distance of about one kilomètre, which still preserves the name of the Field of the Camp (La Pièce du Camp). Perhaps this is the spot where Cæsar placed his camp, opposite the most accessible part of the town.
The principal reason why Orleans has been taken for Genabum is that the Itinerary of Antoninus indicates that town under the name of Cenabum or Cenabo, and that this name is also found in some lately discovered inscriptions. It may be supposed that the inhabitants of Gien, after having escaped from the destruction of their town, descended the river, and, on the spot where Orleans now stands, formed a new establishment, to which they gave the name of the first city; in the same manner the inhabitants of Bibracte removed to Autun, and those of Gergovia to Clermont.
Independently of the above considerations, Orleans, by its position on a declivity uniformly inclined toward the Loire, does not at all answer to the conditions of a Gaulish oppidum. If we admit Orleans to be Genabum, it becomes very difficult to assign a convenient site for the oppida of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
Vellaunodunum. The situation of the territory of the Boii being admitted, as well as that of Genabum, we have to find, on the road which Cæsar pursued from Sens to Gorgobina, the intermediate points of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at the distance of 40 kilomètres from Sens, we meet with the little town of Triguères. The hill which overlooks it from the north agrees with the position of the ancient oppidum; the remains of walls, fosses, and parapets have been found on it. Farther, there were discovered in 1856, at 500 mètres to the north-west of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical theatre, capable of containing from 5,000 to 6,000 spectators. In another direction, the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out; in fact, everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in the Gallo-Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with stones, considered by some as a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by all archæologists as a Roman road, goes direct from Sens to Triguères, by Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the oppidum. Another ancient way leads similarly from Triguères to Gien. We feel no hesitation, after what precedes, in placing Vellaunodunum at Triguères.
It will be objected that the distance from Sens to this little town (40 kilomètres) is too small to have taken the Roman army, without baggage, three days’ march; but Cæsar does not say that he employed three days in proceeding from Agedincum to Vellaunodunum: he informs us merely that, leaving all his baggage at Agedincum, he journeyed towards the country of the Boii, and that on the second day he arrived at Vellaunodunum. Nothing, therefore, obliges us to suppose that, before it marched, the Roman army was concentrated or encamped at Agedincum itself. Persons unacquainted with military art are apt to suppose that an army lives and marches always concentrated on one point.
Cæsar, although he was effecting the concentration of his troops before entering into campaign, did not keep them massed at the gates of Sens, but he probably distributed them in échelon in the neighbourhood of the town, along the Yonne. When afterwards he decided on marching to the succour of the Boii, we must suppose that the first day was employed in concentrating the whole army at Sens itself, in leaving the baggage there, perhaps also in crossing the Yonne, a long operation for more than 60,000 men. The first day having passed, the army continued its march next day, and arrived at Triguères the day following, having performed two days’ march of 20 kilomètres each. We see, then, that the distance between Sens and Triguères does not prevent us from identifying this latter locality with Vellaunodunum. Triguères is distant 44 kilomètres from Gien, the distance which separated Vellaunodunum from Genabum, and which might have been marched in two days.
Noviodunum. To find the site of Noviodunum, we must seek a position which agrees best with the “Commentaries” in the triangle formed by the three known points, Gien, Le Bec-d’Allier, and Bourges. Since, according to the text, Vercingetorix did not raise the siege of the town of the Boii until he had heard of Cæsar’s arrival on the left bank of the Loire, and since the two hostile armies, marching towards each other, met at Noviodunum, it follows that this last-named town must be about half-way between the spot where the Loire was passed and the town of the Boii; on another hand, since Cæsar took several days to reach Bourges from Noviodunum, there must have been a rather considerable distance between those two last-named towns. Moreover, in order that the inhabitants of Noviodunum should have seen in the distance, from the top of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, the town must necessarily have been situated on an eminence. Lastly, the cavalry combat, fought at a small distance from the town, proves that the ground was sufficiently flat to permit that engagement.
It is, therefore, because certain points hitherto indicated do not answer to the conditions required by the text, that we have not admitted, as representing Noviodunum, the towns of Nouan-le-Fuselier, Pierrefitte-sur-Saudre, Nohant-en-Goût, Neuvy-en-Sullias, or Neuvy-sur-Barangeon. In fact, some of these are too far from Bec-d’Allier, while others are too near Bourges, and most of them are situated in a plain.
Sancerre, on the contrary, answers all the conditions of the text. It is situated on a hill which rises 115 mètres above the valley watered by the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines, it can only be approached from one point, situated to the east, where the ancient Roman road of Bourges terminated, which is still at the present day called the Big Road (le Gros Chemin). The Abbé Lebœuf, as early as 1727, had designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near Saint-Satur, at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo-Roman town existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have been found. It is probable that this Gallo-Roman town had succeeded to a great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily have occupied in their territory a point so admirably fortified by nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of boundary between them and the Ædui. The present town seems to have kept within the very limits of the ancient oppidum; it has the form of an ellipse of from 700 to 800 mètres in length on a breadth of about 500 mètres, capable of containing a population of from 4,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. At Sancerre there was also, at the extremity of one of the streets, towards the north, a gate called the Gate of Cæsar (Porte de César), which was demolished in the beginning of the nineteenth century. By adopting Sancerre, all the movements of the commencement of the campaign of 702 are easily explained. This town is forty-six kilomètres from Gien, forty-eight kilomètres from Le Bec-d’Allier, distances nearly equal, so that Vercingetorix and Cæsar, starting almost at the same time from two opposite points, may have met under its walls. Its elevated position allowed the eye to range far towards the south along the valley of the Loire, through which the inhabitants would have seen the approach of the cavalry of Vercingetorix. Cæsar may have occupied with his army the heights of Verdigny or Saint-Satur, to the north of Sancerre. A cavalry engagement may have taken place in the valley of Saint-Satur, or on the plain between Ménétréol and Saint-Thibaud. The captain of staff Rouby has examined with the greatest care the places just mentioned.
Cæsar, after the surrender of Noviodunum, marches towards Bourges. Vercingetorix follows him by short marches (minoribus itineribus). The Roman general, having Bourges before him, and a hostile army on his left, marches slowly and with precaution. Perhaps he took three or four days to perform the forty-five kilomètres which separate Sancerre from Bourges. At last, after having reconnoitred the site of Avaricum, he must have traversed the marshes of the Yèvre, at a distance of three or four kilomètres from that town, so as to take up a position to the south-east of the oppidum, in that part which was not surrounded by the river and the marshes, and which only offered a narrow passage. As to Vercingetorix, he follows, or rather hovers on, the Roman army, taking up his position on its left, and still keeping up his communication with Avaricum, hesitating whether he shall deliver it to the flames.
