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Before proceeding to note the results of the resolutions passed at the Premiers' Conference, it may be of interest to consider to what extent recent events have affected the status of the Federal Council. As has already been remarked, it has pursued a policy of self-effacement, and in spite of the increase in its numbers, it has never appealed to the imagination of Australians. It was undoubtedly dwarfed by comparison with the Federal Convention, which, indeed, decreed its contingent extinction, and it has, to some extent, been supplanted by the informal meetings of Australian Premiers which tend to become an annual institution. At a Conference held at Sydney in January, 1896, the urgent necessity for Federation was again emphasised, and it was resolved that, pending its attainment, the military laws of the Provinces should be assimilated, and a cordite factory be established under State supervision. Resolutions were also passed in favour of a Federal system of quarantine, the distribution of the cost of lighthouses on the basis of population, the extension to all coloured races of the provisions of the Chinese Restriction Acts, and non-participation in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. In this manner the Premiers, instead of referring questions to the Federal Council through their respective legislatures, decided, after personal consultation, upon measures which each would endeavour, in the common interest, to pass through the Parliament of his own Province. Other interprovincial conferences also are becoming more common. The precautions to be adopted against the tick fever were discussed at Sydney in 1896, and a few months ago, earlier, several Ministers of Agriculture met the South Australian Minister at Adelaide and decided upon the advisability of uniform legislation which would promote similarity of out-put in the products of the different Provinces, such as frozen meat, butter, wine, and fruit, for which it was hoped to create a large market in England. It has been argued that the growing realisation of the interdependence of the Provinces and of the material advantages accruing from combined action, will tend to hasten the advent of Federation.

The new proposals in that direction were favourably received, and the Legislatures of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania passed the so-called Australasian Federation Enabling Act, in substantially similar form, upon the lines laid down by the Premiers. The details of their scheme may be gathered from the principal provisions of the Victorian Act:—

"The Convention shall consist of ten Representatives of each Colony represented.

"The Convention shall be charged with the duty of framing for Australasia a Federal Constitution under the Crown in the form of a Bill for enactment by the Imperial Parliament.

"Every Member and every person eligible for Membership of either House of Parliament shall be eligible for Membership of the Convention as a Representative of Victoria. And any one hundred or more electors duly qualified to vote for the election of a Member of the Legislative Assembly shall be entitled in the prescribed manner to nominate any eligible person.

"Every person duly qualified to vote for the election of a member of the Legislative Assembly shall be qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Representatives of Victoria.

"The voting shall be taken throughout Victoria as one electoral district, and every voter shall vote for the full number of Representatives required, otherwise the vote shall be rejected as informal.

"No person shall vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election of Representatives of Victoria."

(A similar provision applies to the subsequent referendum.)

"When the Constitution has been framed by the Convention, copies thereof shall be supplied to the Members of the Convention, and the President shall declare the sitting of the Convention adjourned to a time and place to be fixed by the Convention, not being less than sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days thereafter. And as soon as convenient the draft constitution shall be submitted for consideration to each House of Parliament sitting in Committee of the whole, and such amendments as may be desired by the Legislature, together with the draft Constitution, shall be remitted to the Convention through the Senior Representative.

"On the reassembling of the Convention the Constitution as framed prior to the adjournment shall be reconsidered, together with such suggested amendments as shall have been forwarded by the various Legislatures, and the Constitution so framed shall be finally adopted with any amendments that may be agreed to."

"So soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the Convention the question of the acceptance or rejection of the Constitution shall be referred and submitted to the vote of all persons in Victoria qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Members of the Legislative Assembly."

"The majority of votes shall decide the question, and if the Constitution be thereby rejected, no further action shall be taken pursuant to this Act: Provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than fifty thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill.

"If two Colonies in addition to Victoria accept the Constitution the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of Victoria may adopt a Joint Address to the Queen praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament upon receipt from the Parliaments of such two Colonies, either of similar joint or separate Addresses from each House of such Parliaments."

It will be noticed that the Convention will have entire freedom in regard to any amendments suggested by the Provincial Parliaments, and that if the Constitution be accepted, the Victorian Parliament will not be bound to join in submitting it for Imperial enactment. It is assumed that it will bow to the popular pronouncement unless the Government should have some grave reason for recommending a contrary course. A difficulty, not provided against in the Act, might arise if the Constitution were to be amended during its passage through the Imperial Parliament.

The Act passed by Western Australia provided for the election of the delegates by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as one Chamber, the area of selection being limited to candidates nominated by not less than twenty persons who are qualified to vote at elections for Members of the Assembly. "The draft Constitution, as finally adopted by the Convention, if approved by Parliament, shall be submitted for the decision of the electors of Western Australia by their vote; and if a majority of the electors voting on such question signify their approval of such Constitution, the same may be adopted by the Colony, provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than six thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Constitution." "The adoption of the Constitution by Western Australia may be signified by the passing of an Act or by a joint resolution of both Houses of Parliament, and both Houses may thereupon adopt Addresses to the Queen, praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament, subject to the adoption of similar Addresses by at least two other Colonies, of which New South Wales shall be one." Parliament thus retains the initiative in each successive phase of the movement, but will have no power to alter the Bill when it finally leaves the Convention. If the provisions are regarded as unacceptable, it will be able to decline to submit the Bill to the electorate. The Western Australian measure was based in its general language upon that previously introduced in Queensland, but differed from it in several important particulars. In the latter case it was proposed that the election of the delegates should be vested in the members of the Assembly alone, that, of the ten delegates, five should be chosen by the Southern, three by the Northern, and two by the Central Parliamentary Representatives, a provision inserted in view of the somewhat divergent interests of different portions of the Province, and that the draft Constitution should be submitted for the consideration of the electors in such manner as Parliament might prescribe. The Bill was passed by the Assembly, in spite of a widespread feeling that Queensland should have followed the course of the other Provinces, and was amended by the Council, which regarded itself as unjustifiably ignored, and provided that it should have an equal share with the Assembly in the appointment of the delegates to the Convention. It is unnecessary to consider the arguments by which the Premier supported his proposal of indirect election, or those put forward by the two Houses during the deadlock which followed upon their disagreement. Finally, when each House had insisted several times upon its attitude, the Bill was laid aside by the Council. As a result of this action the new movement was blocked at its first step, which was regarded with little anxiety even by those who appreciated the difficulties which were likely to attend the later stages. Great disappointment was felt in Australia, and efforts were made, though in vain, to induce Sir Hugh Nelson to reintroduce the Bill in some form that would be acceptable to both Houses. At the same time public opinion demanded that the Convention should be held, even though one of the Provinces would be unrepresented.

The benefits which would follow Federation are so obvious as scarcely to require enumeration. The Federal Government would be able to deal adequately with the problem of National Defence and to speak authoritatively, to the manifest satisfaction of the Imperial Authorities, upon such matters as the contribution of Australia towards the expenses of the Imperial squadron maintained upon its coast; the consolidation of the debts would, it has been estimated, enable a million pounds to be saved upon the annual bill of interest; Interprovincial Free Trade would promote intercourse between neighbours who have hitherto been estranged by arbitrary lines of demarcation; and in the words of the Chief Justice of Queensland,¹⁴ "The first effect in point of importance, though some time may elapse before the effect is fully felt, will be the creation of an Australian Nation, forming a distinct constituent part of the British Empire, having one mind, speaking with one voice instead of the six, often discordant and sometimes inarticulate, voices now heard, consulted on all matters of Imperial concern, and exercising a powerful influence in the political affairs of the whole world." Such would appear to be the destiny of Australia, which has, however, doubtless been benefited by the independent development of its component parts. In the absence of distinctions of race and language, in the general diffusion of the Roman Catholics among the Protestants, and the steady determination to exclude coloured races, the early establishment of Federal relations would have produced among Australians a monotonous uniformity of characteristics, which has to some extent been prevented by the divergent political tendencies of the several Provinces.

But, to put the practical question, what are the prospects of Federation? The general impression is not one of hopefulness: it is pointed out that the Provinces have so long maintained an independent existence that they are unlikely to submit to a curtailment of their powers except under the imperative impulse of the fear of foreign invasion; that all but the leading politicians realise that they would be affected prejudicially by a change which would dwarf the Legislatures with which they are connected; that many, especially during the period of depression, dread the creation of a new taxing and governing body; and that the Labour members, in the natural belief that their influence would be smaller in a Federal Parliament, are either apathetic or actively hostile. The economic aspects of Intercolonial Free Trade, in reference to its probable effect upon the prosperity of manufacturers and producers in the different Provinces, also form an important factor in the situation. Time alone can show whether popular participation in the successive stages of the movement, though it will not be universal, will generate an enthusiasm sufficient to outweigh the opposing forces and weld Australia into a strong and united Nation.

APPENDIX TO IX.
THE NEW FEDERAL SCHEME. ¹⁵

Now that the Adelaide Convention has completed its labours, it is possible to give a connected view of the provisions of the draft Constitution Bill, as it will be submitted to the local Parliament, and then after it has been again dealt with by a second meeting of the Convention at Sydney, to the vote of the people.

The Bill provides for the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia and for the appointment of a governor-general by the Queen, at a salary of £10,000. The Federal Parliament is to consist of two Houses—the Senate and the House of Representatives. The former chamber will be composed of six members for each state. They are to be elected by the electors of the Legislative Assembly in each colony for a term of six years, and one-half will retire every three years. For the election of these senators each colony will be regarded as one electorate, and no one will be allowed to vote at more than one polling-booth on the day of election. In other words, the election will be conducted on the same lines as the recent election of representatives to the Federation Convention. At the first meeting of the Senate, the members elected for each state will be divided by lot into two classes, and the seats of those in the first class are to be vacated at the end of the third year, but the others will continue to be members of that House for the full term of six years. In this way one-half the members of the Senate will be elected by the people every third year.

The House of Representatives is to be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the several states, and the number which each colony will return will depend on its population. This Chamber is, as nearly as practicable, to contain double the number of members of the Senate. The House of Representatives would therefore consist, at the outset, of about seventy-two members, which would give as nearly as possible, one member for every 50,000 of the population. Victoria would, roughly speaking, have about twenty-two members. In order, however, to protect the interests of the smaller states in this House, it is provided that Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia, shall be entitled to at least five members each, although on the population basis, the island colony might not be able to claim more than four members. Until the Federal Parliament otherwise provides, each local or state Parliament can determine into how many electoral divisions the colony should be divided for the purpose of returning members to the House of Representatives, but should it not divide the state into electoral districts, then each colony is to be regarded as one electorate, in the same way as in the case of the election of senators.

The duration of every House of Representatives will be three years, unless it is sooner dissolved by the Governor-General. There is no power, however, conferred on the Governor-General to dissolve the Senate. The qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives is in each state to be that for electors of the more numerous House—or Legislative Assembly—of the state. The members of both Houses are to receive an allowance of £400 each per annum for their services.

The following are the subjects the Commonwealth Parliament is to be empowered to legislate upon and deal with:—

1. The regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and among the several states.

2. Customs and excise and bounties.

3. Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation.

4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the commonwealth.

5. Postal and telegraphic services.

6. The military and naval defence of the commonwealth and the several states, and the calling out of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the commonwealth.

7. Munitions of war.

8. Navigation and shipping.

9. Ocean beacons and buoys and ocean lighthouses and lightships.

10. Astronomical and meteorological observations.

11. Quarantine.

12. Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits.

13. Census and statistics.

14. Currency, coinage, and legal tender.

15. Banking, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money.

16. Insurance, excluding state insurance not extending beyond the limits of the state concerned.

17. Weights and measures.

18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes.

19. Bankruptcy and insolvency.

20. Copyrights and patents of inventions, designs, and trade marks.

21. Naturalisation and aliens.

22. Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations, formed in any state or part of the commonwealth.

23. Marriage and divorce.

24. Parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

25. The service and execution throughout the commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and judgments of the courts of the states.

26. The recognition throughout the commonwealth of the laws, the public acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the states.

27. Immigration and emigration.

28. The influx of criminals.

29. External affairs and treaties.

30. The relations of the commonwealth to the islands of the Pacific.

31. The control and regulation of the navigation of the River Murray, and the use of the waters thereof from where it first forms the boundary between Victoria and New South Wales to the sea.

32. The control of railways with respect to transport for the military purposes of the commonwealth.

33. The taking over by the commonwealth, with the consent of the state, of the whole or any part of the railways of any state or states, upon such terms as may be arranged between the commonwealth and the state.

34. Railway construction and extension with the consent of any state or states concerned.

35. Matters referred to the Parliament of the commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any state or states, but so that the law shall extend only to the state or states by whose Parliament or Parliaments the matter was referred, and to such other states as may afterwards adopt the law.

36. The exercise within the commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the states concerned, of any legislative powers which can at the establishment of this constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or by the Federal Council of Australasia.

37. Any matters necessary for, or incidental to, the carrying into execution of the foregoing powers or of any other powers vested by this constitution in the Parliament or the Executive Government of the commonwealth, or in any department or officer thereof.

All matters not mentioned above, such as land settlement, railway construction, &c., are to remain vested in the Parliaments of the several states. Each state shall retain its local Parliament and have a Governor, who is to be appointed by the Crown, and communicate direct with the Crown as at present.

On the establishment of the commonwealth the control of the following departments will be taken over by the Federal Government, and the commonwealth will assume the obligations of any state or states with respect to such matters:—

Customs and excise.

Posts and telegraphs.

Military and naval defence.

Ocean beacons, buoys, lighthouses.

Quarantine.

There are to be seven Ministers of State, and their salaries will, in the aggregate, be £12,000 per annum. A Minister, within three months after being appointed to that office, must become a member of one of the Houses of the Federal Parliament.

All Bills having for their main object the appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or moneys, or the imposition of any tax, must originate in the House of Representatives. Bills imposing taxation must deal with the imposition of taxation only, and those imposing duties of Customs or excise must deal with duties of Customs or excise only. The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the Government must not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for the ordinary annual services, but must be authorised by a separate measure. The Senate can amend any Bills except those imposing taxation, or appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government. With respect to these money measures, the Senate can, at any stage, return a taxation or appropriation Bill to the House of Representatives, suggesting that any provision or item therein should be omitted or amended, and the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments with or without modifications. The Bill, in its amended or original form—should the House of Representatives decline to adopt the suggestion of the Senate—will then be sent back to the latter Chamber, which may either pass or reject the measure.

The seat of the Government of the commonwealth is to be determined by the Federal Parliament. Until such determination the Parliament shall be summoned to meet at such place as the majority of the Governors of the states, or, in the event of an equal division of opinion amongst them, as the Governor-General may direct.

Before the Constitution can be amended an absolute majority of both the House of Representatives and Senate must approve of the alteration, and it must then be confirmed by a vote of the people, a majority of the states being required as well as a majority of the people.

There is to be a federal judiciary, consisting of a high court of Australia, and such inferior courts as Parliament may determine. The high court is to consist of a chief justice, and at least four other judges, and is to hear appeals from the state courts and inferior federal courts. This appeal is to be final, except that in matters affecting the public interests of the commonwealth or of any state, application may be made to the Queen for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Uniform Customs duties are to be imposed within two years of the establishment of the commonwealth, and trade and intercourse throughout the commonwealth is then to be absolutely free. In the meantime the local tariffs are to continue, but they will be collected by the Federal Government, and after deducting from the revenue received in each state the contribution of that state towards federal expenses, the balance is to be returned to the state month by month. During the first three years after federation the total annual expenditure of the Federal Government is to be limited to £300,000 for new federal expenses, and £1,250,000 for services transferred from the states. During the first five years after the imposition of a uniform tariff, the surplus revenue, after deducting the contribution of each state to the federal expenses, is to be returned to the states in the following way: Accounts of Customs and excise duties collected in each state are to be kept during the twelve months following the coming into operation of the uniform tariff, in order to ascertain, first the average net amount per head in each state, and next the average per head for the whole commonweath. A sliding scale, extending over four years, is then to be adopted, in order to determine the amount to be returned. Where the average for a particular state for the first year is less than the general average, the per capita sum is to be increased by equal gradations, until, at the end of four years, it equals the general average. Similarly, where the average for a state is greater than the general average, it is to be gradually reduced to the general average. Then, at the end of the five-year period, all the states will be placed on the same footing, and will receive an equal sum per head from the federal revenue. This scheme of distribution is subject, however, to the important proviso that during the five years the aggregate amount returned to all the states in any year must not be less than the aggregate amount returned in the year immediately preceding the imposition of uniform duties.

Equality of trade is to be preserved throughout the commonwealth, and any law or regulation derogating from that principle is to be null and void. Parliament may appoint an interstate commission to execute and maintain upon railways within the commonwealth, and upon rivers flowing through, in, or between two or more states the provisions of the constitution relating to trade and commerce. The commission is to have such powers of adjudication and administration as may be necessary for its purposes, and as the Parliament may from time to time determine, but shall have no powers in reference to the rates or regulations of any railway in any state, except in cases of rates or regulations preferential in effect, and made and used for the purpose of drawing traffic to that railway from the railway of a neighbouring state.