Читать книгу: «Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century», страница 3

The Dutch force in 1615 was, however, far stronger, and no hostilities took place. For the same reason an armed peace was maintained in 1617, but in the following year acts of aggression were committed, and loud complaints were raised on both sides. An attempt was now made by the King to strengthen the hands of the Muscovy Company by sanctioning for the purposes of the whale fishery an alliance with the East India Company. The two companies were, as far as regards the Spitzbergen enterprise, to be regarded as one, thus making a larger amount of capital available for the outfit of the fishing fleet and for the maintenance of the storage huts and so-called 'cookeries' on shore. Thirteen well-equipped ships sailed for Spitzbergen in 1618, and an even superior number from Holland and Zeeland, accompanied by two war vessels. Neither the English nor the Dutch sailors were in the mood to brook interference, and from the outset it was almost certain that if they met there would be mischief. The English were the first aggressors, but were in their turn attacked by the Dutch with the result that their fleet was dispersed and many of their vessels plundered. The 'Greenland' fisheries question had reached an acute stage. Such a condition of things could not continue, and Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador, appeared in person before the States-General (October 3, 1618) to utter a strong remonstrance and to urge the States, if they wished to remain on good terms with the King, to dispatch a special embassy to deal with the disputes that had arisen between the two countries, not only concerning the 'Greenland' fishing, but in the East Indies, and about the herring fishery and the cloth trade also.

At this point, before giving an account of the embassy of 1618, we must turn back and bring up to date the history of the herring fishery question from 1610, when the execution of the proclamation requiring a licence from the fishermen was postponed, and also briefly touch upon the two other causes of grievance in regard to the cloth trade and the disputes between the two East India Companies.

For several years after the return of the embassy of 1610 the Dutch herring fishery appears to have been quietly carried on as usual without let or hindrance from the English Government. No attempt was made to enforce the proclamation until 1616. The cause of the alteration of James's policy at that date was due to the refusal of the States-General to admit English dyed cloths into the United Provinces. The manufacture of woollen cloth had long been the chief of English industries, and the monopoly of the trade in wool and woollen goods in the Netherlands, Northern France and Western Germany had been in the hands of one of the oldest of English Chartered Companies, the Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers²⁸, whose first charter was granted by Henry VI in 1462. The Adventurer's Court and Staple were for many years placed at Antwerp. But in 1568 they were driven away from the Netherlands by Alva, and forced to settle elsewhere. They went first to Emden, then to Hamburg. But the Hanse towns were jealous of their trade and prosperity, and the Emperor was induced in 1597 to banish them from Germany. At this date the authority of Spain was no longer recognized north of the Scheldt. The Adventurers accordingly in 1598 moved to Middelburg in Zeeland, and extensive privileges were conferred upon them by the States-General, the States of Zeeland, and the town of Middelburg, including freedom from duties on imports or exports, as well as from charges for staple rights and harbour dues, and the right to be tried in their own courts.

The trade of the Adventurers consisted entirely in undyed cloths. The English, though the best weavers of woollen cloth in the world, had not learnt as yet the art of dyeing, and the unfinished cloths were imported into the Netherlands, there to be dressed and dyed for the continental markets. The consequence was that a great industry sprang up in the provinces, especially in Holland, and many thousands of skilled hands were employed in this work.

When James I came to the throne, he listened eagerly to every one who could point out to him any means of raising money by the sale of monopolies or patents. Among the proposals that attracted him was one made by Alderman Sir William Cockayne, who represented to his Majesty the great profit which might be derived from finishing and dyeing English cloth before exportation. The Merchant Adventurers naturally used their utmost influence on the one hand to persuade the King not to grant to Cockayne a patent, which would be subversive of the rights granted to their Company under their Charter, and on the other to obtain the help of the States in preventing such a breach of existing privilege to the injury of the Dutch dyers and finishers. The monopoly of the Adventurers had, however, many enemies among the English merchants who did not belong to the Fellowship, and who already, under the name of 'Interlopers'²⁹, carried on an extensive illegitimate trade through the ports of Amsterdam and Flushing. Cockayne and his adherents prevailed. A patent was granted to him in 1608, his Majesty reserving to himself the monopoly of the sale of all home-dyed goods. It was clear, however, that the existence of the two monopolies side by side could not continue. After much friction and constant complaints, James, in 1615, took decisive action. He forbade the export of undyed and unfinished cloth from England, and commanded the Merchant Adventurers to return their Charter. Cockayne immediately formed a company, but his hopes of creating a new and lucrative English industry were speedily dashed to the ground. The States of Holland passed a resolution forbidding the importation of dyed cloths into their province, and their example was followed by the other provinces separately, and by the States-General. The English woollen trade was stricken fatally by such a prohibition, Cockayne's Company failed, and James was at last compelled in 1617 to renew the Charter of the Adventurers.

It is needless to say that the King, who had hoped to replenish his empty treasury through his active promotion of Cockayne's scheme, was sorely disappointed at the issue, and deeply resented the strong measures taken by Holland and the United Provinces generally to checkmate his plan for the creation of a new English industry to their injury. Baulked in this direction, James, on his side, turned his thoughts to reprisals, and in so doing had on this occasion the full approval of his subjects. Secretary Winwood wrote, September 14, 1616, to Sir Dudley Carleton, at the Hague: —

'It is in the mouth of every true-hearted Englishman that as a reprisal for the publication of the rigorous placard against English dyed and dressed cloths, that his Majesty with justice and equity and in reason of state ought to forbid the Hollanders, by a fresh revival of former proclamations, to continue their yearly fishing on our coast.'

But Winwood had had long personal knowledge of the Dutch, and he did not like the prospect of the two nations, so long and closely bound together by ties of friendship and alliance, thus drifting apart through trade rivalries into enmity.

'If we come', he writes, 'to these extremities I know both we and they shall suffer and smart for it'. And then he continues in words rendered weighty by the experience which lay behind them: 'I know well the nature of that people and the humour of those masters, who sit at the stern of that State. They will not be willingly crossed in their courses —et quod volunt, valde volunt. Yet it is never too late to be wise, and no counsel is evil but that which cannot be changed. I profess unto you I am in great anguish of spirit, how to accommodate these differences to the full contentment of all parties. This is most certain —couste que couste– and though coelum terris misceatur, his Majesty is resolved not to swallow, much less to digest, these indignities. As before I have said, only the Spaniards have cause to triumph and to make bonfires of joy and gladness.' He requests Carleton to see Oldenbarneveldt and urge accommodation for the mutual good of both countries. 'If the States', he adds, 'do persist in their resolutions, actum est de amicitia.'³⁰

But although Winwood speaks in this letter, dated September 24, as if the King was only considering the question of a revival of the proclamation of 1609, steps had already been taken (apparently with his knowledge) to levy a toll upon the fishers on the Scottish coast. As early as June 16, the Duke of Lennox, in his capacity as Admiral of Scotland, had received instructions from the Scottish Council to take from every fishing 'buss' a payment either in money (an angelot) or in kind (one ton of herring and twelve codfish). Accordingly, on August 7, a vessel appeared in the midst of the fishing fleet, having on board a certain John Browne, the Duke's Secretary. The Dutch envoy (Caron) had been induced, under a misconception of the purpose for which it was required, to write a commendatory letter for this man to show to the captains of the Dutch convoy-ships. Browne demanded in the name of the King from the skippers of each 'buss' the above-named toll or excise, and he proceeded to make a list of all their names and the names of the boats, giving receipts to those who paid, and informing those who did not do so that they would have to pay double the following year. The greater part paid without opposition, until the two convoy-ships arrived on the scene. Browne was seized and requested to produce his commission. At the sight of Caron's letter, however, they dismissed him, as he had used no violence, but they would not allow him to collect any more toll.

The two captains, as in duty bound, reported the matter at once to the home authorities. Great was the surprise and indignation at Enkhuysen and other centres of the fishing industry at the reception of the news. On August 27 it was discussed by the States-General, who denounced the attempt to levy a toll as 'an unheard-of and unendurable novelty, conflicting with previous treaties'. Two dispatches were sent, one to Caron telling him 'that the States had taken the matter extremely to heart, and desired him to seek for redress by every possible means'; the other to the captains of the convoy bidding them 'not to permit any toll to be exacted'. In obedience to his instructions Caron made repeated representations to the King, to Lennox, to the Scottish Council, but his arguments and remonstrances fell on deaf ears, and his efforts to obtain satisfaction proved fruitless. In these circumstances the opening of the fishing season of 1617 was awaited in Holland with anxiety, and by those acquainted with the temper of the Dutch seamen, with apprehension. Their fears were justified.

Browne again visited the fishing fleet, and began his task of levying toll, which according to all testimony he carried out in a tactful and considerate manner. Arriving at the Rotterdam convoy-ship he met with a flat refusal from the captain, Andries Tlieff of Rotterdam, in his own name and that of the other Dutch fishermen. After having received this refusal in writing, Browne was preparing quietly to go away to visit the other fishing boats, mostly French, when Jan Albertsz, captain of the Enkhuysen convoy-ship, stepped on board. He was one of the two captains who had in the previous year forcibly compelled Browne to stop his collection of toll. Albertsz now declared that he had orders to arrest Browne, and, despite his protests, the Scottish official was made a prisoner and carried to Holland.

The indignation of James, when he heard of what had taken place, knew no bounds. Two captains of Dutch vessels in the Thames were seized, as hostages, and Carleton was instructed to go in person to the States-General and demand satisfaction for the insult and injury done to his Majesty's honour by the 'exemplary punishment and in a public and open fashion of those, who had committed such an act: a satisfaction such as may hold a just proportion unto the insolency of the grievance.'³¹ On August 23, Carleton, describing the result of an interview with the Advocate, spoke of 'Barneveldt not knowing what to say, but that the taking of Browne was ill-done, and desiring me with his hat in his hand (much differing from his use) to make report thereof to his Majesty.' Both he and also Maurice disavowed Albertsz's action, and the States-General in their turn declared that the captains had acted without instructions, and ordered Browne to be released. At the same time they respectfully insisted that their fishermen were specially exempted from paying any toll for their fishing. They ask Carleton to beg James, as Browne had been set free, to release the hostages that he had seized. But Winwood peremptorily informed Carleton (August 27, O.S.), 'His Majesty will take no satisfaction, but to have the captains and chief officers of the ships sent over prisoners to England.' This demand, however, was most unpalatable in Holland. The States of that province stood upon their privileges. The captains should be tried, they said, but only by their own courts and laws. James, however, would not give way. In Winwood's words 'he insisted, fort et ferme, on the offenders being delivered into his hands'. Thus for many months the obstinate dispute continued. At last (February 1) the States of Holland, the opposition of the towns of Rotterdam and Enkhuysen to deliver up their citizens having been overcome, consented that Albertsz and Tlieff should be sent to Noel Caron to submit themselves to his Majesty's mercy, 'for which,' says Carleton,³² 'in a letter they sue, and' he adds 'they also ask for the freedom of fishing on the coast of Scotland, to which they lay claim, without molestation.' Not till April did Tlieff actually set sail for England, and then without the worse offender, Albertsz, who was very ill, and in fact died shortly afterwards. James now, however, professed himself satisfied, the hostages were set free, and the Browne incident closed without a breach of the peace.

The fishery dispute meanwhile remained an open sore. Loud complaints were made by the Scottish Council that the Dutch not only claimed the right to fish free from any toll, but they under the protection of their armed convoy hindered the Scottish boats from fishing, and took away their nets and otherwise treated them 'with daily outrages and insolences'. This was the state of affairs in 1617. Carleton made many and strong remonstrances, but in 1618 the complaints of the Scotch that they were driven away from the fishing grounds by acts of violence were louder than ever. Instructions had been given to Carleton (April 10, 1618) that, as a means for avoiding these disputes and encounters, he should request the States to order their fishermen to ply their trade out of sight of land, as had been, so he averred, their former custom. After a delay of two months the States, while promising to punish severely all who could be shown to have committed such acts as those complained of, declared that after examination of witnesses on oath they could not discover that any offences such as those spoken of by the King had taken place. As to the Netherlanders fishing out of sight of land, they denied any knowledge of such a custom, and prayed the King not to disturb their countrymen in the exercise of that right of free fishing granted them from time immemorial by a succession of treaties.

Thus in the summer of 1618 we have seen that no less than three burning questions – the Greenland or Spitzbergen fishery, the Great or Herring fishery, and the refusal to admit English dyed or dressed cloths into the Netherlands – were causing the relations between England and the United Provinces to be very strained. A fourth question, that of the disputes of the rival East India Companies as to trading rights in the Banda Islands, Amboyna, and the Moluccas, where the Dutch, being in far stronger force, prevented the English from sharing in the lucrative commerce in spices, was also becoming acute. Several islands – among them one named Pulo Run, which the English, by the consent of the natives, had occupied – were seized by the Dutch, and actual hostilities between the fleets representing the two nations in those waters were only avoided because the English were not in a position to offer effective resistance to their superior adversaries. Negotiations had therefore been set on foot as early as 1615 to effect a friendly understanding by which the English should be allowed a fair share in the spice trade, and the companies co-operate for their common interest. So far, however, in 1618, were matters from being arranged, that a strong fleet had been dispatched from London in that year under Sir Thomas Dale to restore the balance of power in the Bunda archipelago.

When, therefore, as has been already related, Carleton on October 3 appeared in the States-General to protest in the strongest possible language against the acts of hostility committed against the fishing fleet of the Muscovy Company off Spitzbergen, he did not confine himself to this one cause of embittered dispute, but demanded that the States should send at once, promptly and without delay, the special embassy, which had been often spoken of but never taken seriously in hand, to discuss in London all the points of difference between the two nations – the East Indian spice trade, the herring fishery, and the dyed cloth question – and to strive to arrive at a friendly arrangement. Otherwise, he warned them that the King, though he had shown himself willing to bear much at their hands, had now reached the limit of his endurance.

III: 1618-1623

In the Netherlands the minds of all men were throughout the year 1618 preoccupied with the fierce political and religious discords that had brought civil strife into the land. The sword of Maurice had, in the name of the States-General of the Union, overthrown the power of the provincial oligarchies, and despite the strenuous opposition of the States of Holland under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, had made good the claim of the States-General to sovereign authority in the Republic. The aged Advocate of Holland, so long supreme in the administration of public affairs, with his chief adherents, lay in prison awaiting trial and condemnation. Anxious, therefore, at such a crisis, to avoid a breach with King James, or to provoke on his part measures of reprisal (especially in view of the approaching meeting of the Synod of Dort, at which James was to be officially represented), the States announced their readiness (October 18) to accede to Carleton's request for the speedy dispatch of a special embassy. But they wished to confine the subjects of discussion to the East Indian and Greenland disputes. In vain Carleton pressed upon the States the urgency of including the Great (Herring) Fishery and dyed cloth questions in the instruction. The reply was that it would be dangerous in the disturbed condition of the country to touch matters of such great importance affecting the interests of so large a portion of the population of the maritime provinces. A clear indication was moreover given that on these two points there was little possibility of concession.

The ambassadors arrived in England (December 7) accompanied by five commissioners of the East India Company. The King received them with expressions of friendliness (December 20), but the examination of their instructions by the Privy Council at once revealed that the subject of the Great Fisheries, which had most interest for the English, was omitted. The Dutch envoys accordingly were informed that the King was very astonished that the warnings of Carleton had been without effect, and that their mission would be fruitless unless this point, which concerned the King's sovereign rights, were placed in the forefront of the negotiations. James, indeed, refused to proceed unless the instructions were altered, and held out the threat of an alliance with Spain if his wishes were not complied with. Carleton, indeed, in a long and angry representation made to the States-General, January 12, 1619, practically demanded, not only that the ambassadors should be instructed to deal with the Great Fishery question, but to admit that their rights under ancient treaties and their contention as to the freedom of the sea were claims that could not be sustained in face of the King's 'lawful title and exclusive sovereign rights and property in the fisheries upon the coasts of his three kingdoms'. In case of delay, England would maintain her rights with the armed hand. The King was resolved that the grievances of which his subjects complained must cease.

The States-General, however, dared not in the midst of the crisis through which the country was passing, interfere with the fishery question. Maurice, as Captain-General of the Union, had by military force overpowered the resistance of the Province of Holland to the will of the States-General. Its leaders had been incarcerated, and the town magistracies throughout Holland changed. Feelings were very embittered, and the position of the new magistrates would have been seriously endangered had the dominant party consented to yield to English threats the rights of free fishing, an industry on which some 50,000 persons in Holland depended for their livelihood. Both Maurice and his cousin and trusted adviser, William Lewis of Nassau, Stadholder of Friesland, were agreed that such a course was at the moment unwise, if not impracticable. These considerations were laid before James, who had throughout the discussions in the Republic strongly sympathized with the triumphant Contra-Remonstrant party. The result was a modification in his unbending attitude. The King agreed to defer the discussion of the 'Great Fishery' question until the internal state of the Netherlands had become more settled, and to proceed with the Greenland fishery and East Indian matters first, on condition that the delay was to be as short as possible and not to extend beyond the end of the year. Indeed, September 1 was named as the actual limit of time. The States were quickly informed (January 21) of the English concession, and now that the tension was relieved, took more than three weeks in which to consider carefully the terms of their answer to Carleton. They were in a difficult position, and they finally (February 13) gave in general terms a non-committal undertaking that 'so soon as the affairs of this land, political and religious, shall be brought into a better state – if possible within a year', they will send ambassadors to treat of the Great Fishery, the cloth trade, and other points, as a preliminary to the revision of the treaties of intercourse. Meanwhile they trusted that all should go on as before, and that the English would make no innovation in contravention of the ancient customs and treaties. So the matter rested, the States being warned that the King demanded that the placard of June 5, 1618, forbidding the Dutch fishermen to commit further outrages and excesses 'on pain of severe penalties', or to approach within sight (the English said within 14 miles, but to this the Dutch objected) of the Scottish coast, should be rigidly enforced during the intermediate period of delay.

The efforts of the Dutch ambassadors to settle the two questions which according to their instructions were the chief object of their mission nevertheless encountered serious difficulties, and it was soon apparent that the views of the two parties were almost irreconcilable. The scheme for a working union of the two East India Companies was speedily given up. For months, however, the rights and wrongs of the two nations with regard to the Greenland (Spitzbergen) fisheries were the subject of many conferences and interchanges of notes. The English maintained that they, on the ground of first discovery and of being the first to fish in the Spitzbergen waters, had exclusive rights of sovereignty both on the land and the seas that surrounded it. The Dutch set up the counter-claim that they had not only first discovered, but first occupied the land, and they held firmly that the sea was free to all nations. For the damages suffered by the English fishing fleet at the hands of the Netherlanders in 1618 an indemnity was demanded by the English Government amounting to £43,800, and this did not include the amounts due to private ship-owners for the loss of their trade, and to the relatives of those who had been killed or wounded. The Dutch replied by pointing to the repeated provocations the Hollanders and Zeelanders had had year by year to endure, and to the losses they on their side had suffered not only through being hindered in their fishing, but through actual plundering of their goods. The ambassadors promised to give reparation, if the English would do the same. Tired at last of fruitless discussions, prolonged month after month, the Dutch envoys sought a personal interview with the King, July 10, at Greenwich, to see if any modus vivendi could be arrived at. All the old arguments on both sides were repeated, and neither would yield on the point of their several 'rights'; the utmost the King would concede was a suggestion that, as a favour, he might connive at the Netherlanders fishing in his waters. This did not satisfy the ambassadors, and they fell back on the familiar device of asking that the question should be put off for later settlement. To this finally James agreed, and it was arranged that the matter should be deferred for further negotiations for a period of three years, and that meanwhile the English and Dutch were to fish peaceably together. The King insisted that restitution should be made for the damage done by the armed attack on the English fleet in 1618 within three months, and for all other losses inflicted by the Dutch within the three years. As soon as the full English claims were settled (such was the ultimatum), the question of the satisfaction due to the Netherlanders should be considered. With this decision, however unpalatable to them, the envoys had perforce to be content. They sailed from Gravesend, on August 1, without having really effected anything but a postponement of disputes, which mere delay was more likely to aggravate than to appease.

The results then of the embassy of 1618 were disappointing to both parties. The English resented the continued presence of the Dutch fishermen both in the home waters and in the Northern Seas, for they not only carried off the profits from what were regarded as British industries, but behaved with overbearing arrogance as if in their own domain. The Hollanders found themselves permitted, as it were on sufferance, to continue an occupation which supplied a large part of their population with sustenance and was the basis of their prosperity. The States-General, though they were committed by their envoys to send a fresh embassy to deal with the question of the Great Fisheries, as soon as the internal troubles of the country were settled, were in no hurry to move in the matter. It was in vain that Carleton in the early months of 1620 reminded them of their undertaking. The general opinion in Holland, and in this Prince Maurice himself shared, was that there could be no surrender of the treaty right to free fishing, even though it should be at the cost of war.

Their position was greatly strengthened by the momentous events that had been occurring in Germany. The Elector Palatine, Frederick – King James's son-in-law – had accepted the Crown of Bohemia (November, 1619) but a year later his forces were crushed by the Imperial army at the White Hill near Prague (November 5). Meanwhile his hereditary dominions had been invaded and conquered by a Spanish force under Spinola. Frederick was head of the Protestant Union, but the forces of the Union were disunited (indeed it was soon afterwards dissolved), and although Sir Horace Vere, at the head of a fine body of 2,000 English volunteers, escorted by a strong Dutch force, made his way to the scene of conflict, he was unable to prevent the Spanish conquest of the Lower Palatinate. The unfortunate King of Bohemia, a homeless fugitive, was compelled with his wife, Elizabeth of England, to seek refuge with his uncle, the Prince of Orange, at the Hague. The Dutch were greatly disturbed, as the twelve years' truce was drawing to an end, at the prospect of the Spaniards being able through their alliance with the Emperor to march from their post of vantage on the Rhine straight upon the Netherlands, and were therefore anxious to secure the goodwill and help of England in the serious struggle which they saw before them. They felt confident that, despite his love of peace, James would be forced to take active steps to defend his son-in-law's lands from conquest, and the cause of Protestantism in Germany from ruin. The news of the complete defeat of Frederick at the White Hill therefore, together with the necessity of renewing the treaty between the two countries, which expired in April, 1621, at the end of the truce, had more effect than Carleton's remonstrances and threats in hastening a renewal of negotiations. The English ambassador was instructed to assure the States that James would lend assistance for the recovery of the Palatinate, and it was resolved by them that a special mission should be dispatched as soon as possible. It was well known that the King was still on the most confidential terms with Gondomar, and that the Spanish envoy continued to exercise a strong influence upon the royal policy, and that the project of a Spanish marriage had not been abandoned. It was felt therefore that a strong effort should be made to counteract this secret leaning of James to listen to the subtle counsels of the Spaniard, and to persuade him to break with Spain and to take decisively the Protestant side in the war against the allied forces of the House of Habsburg.