Читать книгу: «Slavery and the Constitution», страница 9
"Valuable Servant at Private Sale. – We have for sale a valuable servant-girl, aged about 17 years. She is an excellent house-servant. Sold for no fault; the owner about removing to the country.
Ed. C. & G. F. Dyer,Auctioneers and Commission Merchants."
The same paper of January 20, 1844, contains the following: —
"For Sale, – Two likely mulatto women; one middle-aged, an excellent cook, washer, and ironer, and a good seamstress; the other young, and a good seamstress and house-servant; and both capable of doing any work required in a family. They are sold on account of the owner not having sufficient employment.– Apply to Mr. Henry Trunnel, Georgetown."
In the same paper, Nov. 2, 1844, we find this: —
"A Negro-boy for Sale or Hire. – A boy, 16 years old, well-grown and active, is for sale, but not to a trader. He has been employed in attending to horses, driving a carriage, working in a garden, &c. and will be sold only because the owner has too many servants. He may be had on trial. – Apply at J. B. Holmead's Auction Rooms."
The boy is not to be sold to a trader; but there can be no security that the purchaser will not thus sell him.
The "Spirit of Liberty" contains a notice, from "Scott's Intelligence Office," of the sale of three negro girls, aged 10, 19, and 16 years respectively, and a boy 14 years old. The notice states, "All the above servants are sold for no faults, and are just from the country, consigned to me for sale by their owners, who recommend them very highly; they wish to reduce their stock of negroes is the cause of their being in the market for sale."
Perhaps some one or more of Dr. Fuller's heirs may be indebted. What, in such case, will prevent a creditor from levying on an undivided share of Dr. Fuller's happy slaves? Perhaps the debtor may wish to convey his property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors. We take the following advertisement from the "National Anti-Slavery Standard," April 15, 1847: —
"Trustee's Sale. – Plantation and negroes in Washington County, Mississippi; and Yazoo city town lot and buildings. On Monday, the first of February, 1847, I will proceed to sell, by virtue of a certain deed of trust, executed 10th May, 1845, by Thomas J. Reed, to me, as trustee, and duly recorded in the proper county, and at the special instance and request of the creditors named in said deed, at public sale, to the highest bidder, for cash, on the premises, the following described lands, situated, lying, and being in the county of Washington, and State of Mississippi, and described as follows, to wit: —
"Section No. 3, &c. &c.
"Also one undivided half of the following named negroes, slaves for life, held jointly with the heirs of Baine, viz. Sophia, aged 45; Nancy, 35; Queen, 40; Jane, 19; Rachel, 11; Priscella; Jenny, 60; Maria, 30; Lydia, 30; Amanda, 22; Edna, 30; Vina, 36; Betsy, 35; Ellen, 9; Peyton, 8; Bob, 4; Louis, 15; Chub, 8; Horace, 6; Louisa, 1; Jim, jr. 4; Mary, 4½; Harriet, 6; Dick, 9; George, 5; Billy, 50; John Brown, 36; Alexander, 40; Louis Johnson, 62; Hatton, 35; Jim, sen. 42; Frank, 50; John, jr. or Little John, 16; John Mitchell, 47; Louis Davis, 40; Warren, 40; Ben, 36; Oliver, 40; Louis, jr. or Charles Louis, 5; Lawson, 35; Sam, 19; Harvey, 21; Fleming, 6; Amy, 4; Bonaparte, 3; Catherine (Queen's child), 2.
"And further, all the right, title, and interest of said Reed in and to the following named slaves, to wit, Henny and her three children, Dick, Jane, and Peter; together with all the stock of horses, cattle, mules, hogs, and farming implements appertaining to said tracts of land, which is believed to be an entire estate in fee.
"The above sale will be for cash, and I will convey to the purchaser only such title as is vested in me by said deed of trust.
W. S. Mott.
"No postponement on account of the weather."
Other cases might doubtless be put; but these are sufficient to enable us to test the question of right and wrong. And no labored argument is necessary. Dr. Fuller admits (what we have already proved) that slaveholding is most generally wrong, because it is accompanied by the mental and moral degradation of the slaves. But, by voluntarily retaining the ownership of his slaves, he renders just such a degradation almost inevitable even for them. Without the slightest necessity for so doing, and solely because he wishes so to do, he renders almost certain the hopeless degradation of his fellow-man. Such conduct cannot be right, even though (as doubtless in his case) pursued from right motives. No one has the right unnecessarily to impede our spiritual or mental culture, even in the slightest degree, – much less unnecessarily to expose us, almost certainly, to hopeless degradation. No more have we the right, by holding our fellows in slavery, to render almost inevitable the death of their souls.
Slaveholding, then, is always wrong, because it either deliberately murders the souls of its victims, or else renders such spiritual death almost inevitable. Nor is slaveholding ever made right by the fact that the slaves will not consent to be emancipated; for no man can rightfully consent to his own degradation. What man would consent to become even the favored slave of Dr. Fuller?
CHAPTER XI.
THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION
The Constitution is not what it ought to be, not what we wish it to be; not what is consistent with sound morals, but simply what its words meant in 1789, – nothing more, nothing less.
The Constitution of the United States was drawn up by a Convention, of which Washington was president. The people, assembled in their State Conventions, adopted the draft, because it aptly expressed the kind of union they wished to have, because it fully and exactly expressed their meaning. In order, therefore, to ascertain the character of our political union with the Slave States, we have only to ascertain the true meaning of the words of the Constitution, or their plain, obvious, and common meaning, at the time the Constitution was adopted. Every writer who wishes to be understood uses his words in their usual signification. Every one supposes that we mean just what our words commonly mean now. When we read Chaucer, or Shakspeare, or Dr. Johnson, we understand him to mean just what his words commonly meant at the time he wrote, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified by the context, in which case we adopt this new or qualified meaning. In like manner, the people of the United States are to be understood to mean, by the words of the Constitution, just what those words commonly meant when the Constitution was adopted, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified by the context; in which case, a regard for truth obliges us to adopt this new or qualified meaning.
This simple, true, and universally practised rule is thus laid down by Judge Story (Comm. on Const. Abr. § 210): —
"Every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or juridical research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss." – Sec. 212: "Where technical words are used, the technical meaning is to be applied to them, unless it is repelled by the context. But the same word often possesses a technical and a common sense. In such a case, the latter is to be preferred, unless some attendant circumstance points clearly to the former."
The Constitution was also framed and adopted with reference to the actual political, social, and local condition of the people. It grew out of their wants and wishes. The steps which finally led to its adoption grew out of one of the many defects in the articles of confederation. Consequently, to arrive at the true meaning of the Constitution, we must bear in mind the political, social, and local condition of the people at the time of its adoption, and, among many other similar facts, the very general existence of domestic slavery.[V]
Keeping in view these, the very simplest rules of interpretation, we will show what the Constitution is according to the common meaning of its terms; what its framers intended to make it; what, in point of fact, it has been considered to be in the practice of the government; and, finally, what it has been adjudged to mean by that body which it has itself pointed out as the final arbiter of its meaning. And, if all these unite in giving the Constitution but one character, we, as reasonable men, seeking the truth, cannot deny that such is its true character.
CHAPTER XII.
THE CONSTITUTION ACCORDING TO THE COMMON MEANING OF ITS TERMS
The people made it, the people adopted it, the people must be supposed to read it with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in it any hidden or extraordinary meaning.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, slavery existed in all the States except Massachusetts. How far, if at all, does this instrument support or countenance the institution?
Art. 1, sec. 2: "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons."
By this section, persons are divided into those who are free and those who are slaves; for to the whole number of free persons are to be added three-fifths of all other persons, that is, persons not free, or slaves. If we adopt the plain, obvious, and common meaning of the words as their true meaning, this conclusion is incontrovertible.
It is sometimes urged, that by "free person" is meant "citizen." But the expression cannot be taken in any such technical sense. Under the expression "free persons" are included those bound to service for a term of years, and therefore from it are excluded those bound to service for life, or slaves.
This article, therefore, recognizes slavery as explicitly as if the word slave itself had been used, and gives to the free persons in a Slave State, solely because they are slaveholders, a larger representation, and consequently greater political power, than the same number of free persons in a Free State. A BOUNTY ON SLAVEHOLDING!
Art. 1, sec. 9: "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."
It is clear that this section recognizes a difference between the meaning of migration and importation, since, if both words mean the same thing, no reason whatever can be assigned why a tax is not permitted in both cases. This difference, whatever it is, must afford a good reason why persons imported may be taxed, and persons migrating not. The true meaning of the section seems obvious. A person who migrates does so of his own accord: he cannot be said to be migrated by any other person. He is wholly a free agent. A person who is imported does not import himself, but is imported by some other person. He is passive. The importer is the free agent; the person imported is not a free agent. Thus the slave-laws of Virginia of 1748[W] and 1753[X] begin – "All persons who have been or shall be imported," &c. &c. "shall be accounted and be slaves." Whenever we hear an importation spoken of, we instantly infer an importer, an owner, and property imported. This distinction between the meaning of the two words is, then, real. It affords a good reason for the restriction on the right to tax. Therefore, we say, it is the true distinction. On our construction, Congress had power to lay a tax on persons imported as property or slaves, but had no right to tax free persons migrating.
By this clause, therefore, Congress was prevented, during twenty years, from prohibiting the foreign slave-trade with any State that pleased to allow it. But, by Art. 1, sec. 8, Congress had the general power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Consequently, the slave-trade was excepted from the operation of the general power, with a view to place the slave-trade, during twenty years, solely under the control of the Slave States. It could not be wholly stopped, so long as one State wished to continue it. It is a clear compromise in favor of slavery. True, the compromise was a temporary one; but it will be noticed, that Congress, even after 1808, was not obliged to prohibit the trade; and, in point of fact, until 1819 the laws of Congress authorized the States to sell into slavery, for their own benefit, negroes imported contrary to the laws of the United States! (Act Congr. 1807, c. 77, § 4, 6; 1818, c. 86, § 5 and 7; 10 Wheat. Rep. 321, 322.) So unmixed should be our satisfaction at the oft-repeated boast, that ours was the first nation to prohibit the African slave-trade!
Art. 4, sec. 2: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
The time of holding not being limited, the expression here used must include not only persons held to service or labor for a term of years, but also those held to service or labor for life. Consequently, it includes those who are free persons within the meaning of Art. 1, sec. 2, and slaves or persons held to service or labor for life.
That the expression "person held to service or labor" was a correct definition of the condition of a slave, at the time the Constitution was adopted, is evident. The sixth article of the North-western ordinance reads thus: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; provided always, that, any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid." In other words, the expression "a person from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed" so correctly described the condition of a slave, that Congress deemed it necessary to except such persons from the operation of an article relating only to slaves. In less than three months after the passage of this ordinance, this clause in the Constitution was drafted. It needs no argument to show, that the expression in the Constitution means the same as that in the ordinance. "A person from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States" means the same as "a person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof." If the former correctly described the condition of a slave, the latter did also.
We can, however, see that the expression does properly describe the legal condition of a slave. A slave, though an article of property, has always and in every State been recognized as a person, by being held criminally responsible for his acts. Thus the preamble to the Act of South Carolina (May 10, 1740; 1 Grimke's Laws, 165), which provides for the trial of slaves, recites that "natural justice forbids that any person, of what condition soever, should be condemned unheard;" and the Act of Georgia of 1770 (Prince's Dig. 777) provides for the trial of "slaves and other persons." The Act of Virginia (1748, sec. 15; 5 Hen. Stat. 547) and North Carolina (1741, sec. 29; Iredell, Stat. 62-66) call runaway slaves persons in so many words. Similar laws might be cited, if deemed necessary. A slave is also held to labor and service for life by law. Labor and service are the lot of every slave. "To slave" means "to toil." It is sometimes denied, but nevertheless it is true, that the law recognizes that labor and service are legally due from the slave to his master. Thus the Act of North Carolina (1741, sec. 27), before quoted, makes it a criminal offence to tempt or persuade a slave to leave his master's "service." "Service" is recognized as being legally due from a slave in Virginia (Act 1691, 3 Hen. Stat. 86, 87). The Provincial Assembly of South Carolina (Act 1740, sec. 44) provided that, —
"If any owner of slaves, or other person who shall have the care, management, or overseeing of any slaves, shall work, or put any such slave or slaves to labor, more than fifteen hours in twenty-four hours, from the twenty-fifth day of March to the twenty-fifth day of September, or more than fourteen hours in twenty-four hours, from the twenty-fifth day of September to the twenty-fifth day of March, every such person shall forfeit any sum not exceeding twenty pounds, nor under five pounds, current money for every time he, she, or they shall offend herein, at the discretion of the justice before whom the complaint shall be made."
The Provincial Assembly of Georgia (Act 1770, May 10, sec. 41) provided that, —
"If any person shall, on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, employ any slave in any work or labor (works of absolute necessity and the necessary occasions of the family only excepted), every person so offending shall forfeit and pay the sum of ten shillings for every slave he, she, or they shall so cause to work or labor."
A similar law was passed in South Carolina (Act 1740, sec. 22). These and similar laws, by limiting the hours of daily work and labor, or by providing that work and labor shall not be demanded of a slave on Sunday, recognize that on other days, and within certain hours, a master may legally demand them. That which may be legally demanded is legally due. Therefore, work and labor, or service, are legally due from the slave to his master. To this labor and service the slave is "held" by the law. If he refuses to work, his master may coerce him. If he runs away, his master may pursue and retake him legally. He is "held for life," or until emancipated according to law. Consequently, the expression in the Constitution correctly describes the condition of a slave. Indeed, it more correctly describes this condition than "chattel personal" would, because it is the almost universal practice to treat a slave in many important particulars, such as dower, &c. like real property; and, in some States, slaves are declared by statute to be real estate.
By this section, therefore, it is provided that no person held as a slave in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from his slavery, but shall be delivered up on claim of his owner. The laws of one State, whether they support slavery or any other institution, have no power in another State. Consequently, if a slave escapes into a Free State, he becomes free. This is the general rule of law. In virtue of it, thousands of slaves are now free on the soil of Canada. In virtue of it, a fugitive slave from South Carolina would be free in this State, were it not for this section in the Constitution. But this section declares that he shall not thereby become free, but shall be delivered up. Again, the Constitution makes an exception from a general rule of law in favor of slavery. It gives to slaveholders, and slave-laws, a power which the general rule of law does not give. It enables a South Carolina slaveholder to drag from the soil of Massachusetts a person whom the general rule of law pronounces free, solely because South Carolina laws declare the contrary. It makes the whole Union a vast hunting-ground for slaves! There is not a single spot from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the St. John's to the Rio del Norte, or "wheresoe'er may be the fleeting boundary of this republic," on which a fugitive slave may rest, and his owner may not, in virtue of this clause, claim and retake him as his slave!
Art. 1, sec. 8: "Congress shall have power … to provide for calling forth the militia … to suppress insurrections."
Art. 4, sec. 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence."
All insurrections and all cases of domestic violence are here provided for. To constitute an insurrection within the meaning of the Constitution, there must be a rising against those laws which are recognized as such by the Constitution; and, to make out a case of domestic violence, the violence must be exerted against that right or power which is recognized by the Constitution as lawful. But, by Art. 4, sec. 2, the Constitution admits that some persons are legally slaves; else the clause itself must be entirely inoperative. Consequently, if these persons rise in rebellion, or commit acts of violence contrary to the laws which hold them in slavery, their rising constitutes an insurrection; such acts are acts of violence within the meaning of the Constitution, and consequently must be suppressed by the national power. And what insurrections were more likely to happen and more to be dreaded than slave-insurrections, and therefore more likely to have been provided for?
Slave-owners are not the only slaveholders. All persons who voluntarily assist or pledge themselves to assist in holding persons in slavery are slaveholders. In sober truth, then, we are a nation of slaveholders! for we have bound our whole national strength to the slave-owners, to aid them, if necessary, in holding their slaves in subjection!
