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ON CHAPTER XI
(11) We often find the intellect identified by the scholastics with the thing known, even when they treat of created intellects; but this identity is limited to the purely ideal order, and denotes only the intimate union of the idea and the intellect. It is well known what importance they attached to matters and forms; and this distinction is also applied to the phenomena of intelligence. Although the idea was considered as a thing distinct from the intellect, yet, as the intellect is perfected by it, and placed in relation with the thing represented, they said that the intellect was the same as the thing known. We must thus explain passages in St. Thomas and other scholastics, since, although their expressions, if considered in isolation, would be inexact, they are not so, if regard be had to the meaning which they attributed to them, and which clearly follows from their fundamental principles. Thus St. Thomas (Quodlibet. 7 A. 2), to prove that the created intellect cannot know many things at the same time, says:
"Sed quod intellectus simul intelligat plura intelligibilia, primo et principaliter, est impossibile. Cujus ratio est quia intellectus secundum actum est omnino, id est, perfecte res intellecta: ut dicitur in 3 de anima. Quod quidem intelligendum est non quod essentia intellectus fiat res intellecta vel species ejus; sed quia complete informatur per speciem rei intellectæ, dum eam actu intelligit. Unde intellectum simul plura intelligere primo, idem est ac si res una simul esset plura. In rebus enim materiabilus videmus quod una res numero non potest esse simul plura in actu, sed plura in potentia.
"Unde patet quod sicut una res materialis non potest esse simul plura actu, ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere primo. Et hoc est quod Alga, dicit, quod sicut unum corpus non potest simul figurari pluribus figuris; ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere. Nec potest dici quod intellectus informatur perfecte simul pluribus speciebus intelligibilibus, sicut unum corpus simul informatur figura et colore; quia figura et color non sunt formæ unius generis, nec in eodem ordine accipiuntur quia non ordinantur ad perficiendum in esse unius rationis; sed omnes formæ intelligibiles in quantum hujusmodi, sunt unius generis, et in eodem ordine se habent ad intellectum, in quantum perficiunt intellectum in hoc quod est esse intellectum in actu. Unde plures species intelligibiles se habent sicut figuræ plures, vel plures colores, qui simul in actu in eodem esse non possunt secundum idem."
By the first passage, we see that the meaning of identity of the intellect with the thing known, is the same as explained in the beginning of this note; to wit, the intimate union of the idea of intelligible species with the intellect, as the form with its matter, – a form which perfects the intellect, makes it pass from potentiality to actuality, and places it in relation with the thing represented.
ON CHAPTER XII
(12) The doctrine of immediate intelligibility is susceptible of still further illustration; but as this cannot be clearly done without examining at length the nature of ideas, which does not pertain to our present treatise, we shall reserve it for its proper place.
ON CHAPTER XIII
(13) Enough, perhaps, was not said in the text to enable all readers to form clear and complete ideas of the representation of causality; but this doctrine, as regards the first intelligence, is closely allied to the questions on the foundation of the possibility even of non-existent things, – questions which we cannot here investigate without reversing the order of subjects.
ON CHAPTER XIV
(14) The distinction of geometrical and non-geometrical orders of ideas is of the utmost importance in ideology. We have given this distinction in order that the examination of a truth fundamental among purely ideal truths might not remain incomplete. But its explanation and foundation will be given in our treatise on the of space and extension.
ON CHAPTER XV
(15) The word instinct, when applied to the intellect, is clearly taken in a different sense than it is when applied to irrational animals. It has here no ignoble meaning; and this is in accordance with the use made of it when divine things are spoken of. One meaning given it by the dictionary is, "impulse, or movement of the Holy Ghost, in speaking of supernatural inspirations." The Latin, instinctus, means inspiration. Thus: "Sacro mens instincta furore."
ON CHAPTER XVI
(16) The confusion of ideas upon this point originates in that tendency to unity of which we spoke in our Fourth Chapter. We first suppose there must be one only principle, and we ask what it is; whereas, before inquiring what it is, we should ascertain if there be one only, as is supposed. We have already seen that Fichte's system rested on the same supposition. Thus the cause of innocent disputes in the schools may lead to more transcendental errors.
ON CHAPTER XVII
(17) We have, we think, faithfully interpreted the thought of Descartes, but lest there should be some doubt as to this, we subjoin a notable passage from his answer to the objections collected by Père Mersenne from various philosophers and theologians, against the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Meditations.
"When we know that we are something that thinks, this first notion is taken from no syllogisms; and when any one says: I think, therefore I am, or exist, he does not infer his existence from thought, as by the force of a syllogism, but as a thing known by itself; he sees it by a simple inspection of the mind; for if he deduced it from a syllogism, he would have to know beforehand this major; whatever thinks, is, or exists. On the contrary, this proposition is manifested to him by his own sentiment that he cannot think without existing. It is a property characteristic of our mind to form general propositions from the knowledge of particular propositions." Descartes does not always explain himself with this clearness; the objections of his adversaries made him examine his doctrine more thoroughly, and this contributed to clear up his ideas.
ON CHAPTER XVIII
(18) To form an accurate estimate of Descartes' views, let us listen to his own explanation of his system.
"As the senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing of what they make us imagine appeared; as there are men who are deceived, and make paralogisms even when reasoning upon the simplest matters of geometry, I judged myself as liable to err as they are, and I rejected as false all those reasons I had before held to be demonstrations; and also considering that even the thoughts which we have while awake may come to us while asleep, although no one of them may be true, I resolved to feign that all things which had entered my mind contained no more truth than illusory dreams. But I immediately observed that, while I wished to think that every thing was false, it was necessary for me, who thought this, to be something; and, noting that this truth: I think, therefore I am, was so firm and secure, that the most extravagant suppositions could not shake it, I judged that I might, without scruple, receive it as the first truth of philosophy." —Discours sur la Méthode. P. 4ieme.
We said that the doubt of Descartes was a supposition, a fiction, and these are the very terms he himself uses. In his reply to the objections of Père Mersenne, we find the following confirmatory extract: "I have read with great satisfaction your observations upon my treatise on philosophy, for they show your good-will towards me, your piety towards God, and your zeal for the advance of his glory. I cannot but rejoice that you have judged my arguments worthy of your criticism, but also that you say nothing not easily answerable.
"In the first place, you remind me that I have rejected the ideas of phantasms of bodies, not truly, but only by a mere fiction, in order to conclude that I am something that thinks, fearing, perhaps, that I should believe it followed from this that I am only something that thinks; but I have already shown, in my Second Meditation, that I agreed with this, and I said: 'But these things, which I suppose not to be, because I do not know them, may not really be any thing different from me who know them; of this I can say nothing, I have at present nothing to do with it.'" * * * * * * *
We here see that Descartes did not deny his doubt to be a mere fiction; he even says that he does nothing but apply a method, the necessity of which all philosophers admit.
"I pray you," he continues, "to remember that with respect to matters of the will, I have always made a broad distinction between the contemplation of truth and the uses of life; as regards the latter, I am so far from thinking that we must follow only things very clearly known, that I believe we must not always consider even what is most probable, but that we must, among things wholly unknown or uncertain, sometimes choose one, and hold firmly to it, so long as we see no reason for not doing so, just as if we had chosen it from evident and certain motives, as I have already explained in the Discours sur la Méthode; but when we treat only of the contemplation of truth, who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known?"
In what, then, consists Descartes' merit? In having applied a rule known to all, and employed by few, and in so doing at the very time that prejudices in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine were the strongest. Descartes plainly says so; his method of doubting is not new, only the application of it was wanting; for, as regards its fundamental principle, "who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known?"
Understanding Descartes' method in this sense, that is, taking the doubt as a supposition, a mere fiction, it is not opposed to sound religious and moral principles. The profound philosopher does not seem to disdain to set his readers at rest upon this point; he ingenuously shows, in commencing his investigations, that his religious belief was safe. "Finally, as before undertaking to rebuild the house wherein one lives, it is not enough to demolish the old one, and provide materials and workmen, or to exercise one's self in architecture, and to carefully trace the design of the new house; but it is also necessary to have another house in which to live, while the new one is building; so that my actions might not be unresolved, like my judgments, and that I might, in the meantime, live as happily as possible, I made a provision for myself; it consists of three or four maxims. The first is, to observe the laws and customs of my country, and constantly to preserve the religion in which, by the grace of God, I have been instructed from my infancy. * * * * * * After having assured myself of these maxims, and laid them aside with the truths of faith which have always been first in my belief, I judged that I might freely reject the rest of my opinions." —Discours sur la Méthode, P. 3ieme.
ON CHAPTER XIX
(19) With respect to the distinction between the testimony of consciousness and that of evidence, as in the analysis of the proposition: I think, therefore I am; there can be no doubt that Descartes did not express himself with sufficient precision and exactness. See, for example, this extract: "After this, I considered in general what is necessary for a proposition to be true and certain; for, although I had not yet met such a one, I nevertheless thought I ought to know in what this certainty consisted; and observing that in the proposition, I think, therefore I am, there is nothing to assure me of its truth, except the clear perception that in order to think I must be, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that things clearly and distinctly conceived are all true; only there is some difficulty in ascertaining what things we do distinctly conceive." —Discours sur la Méthode. Partie 4me.
ON CHAPTER XX
(20) The apodictical certainty of which Kant speaks in the passage cited, is the result of the intrinsic evidence of ideas, or, in other words, it is what the schoolmen called metaphysical certainty.
ON CHAPTER XXI
(21) Besides the questions on the principle of contradiction as the only foundation of certainty, there are others as to its scientific utility and importance. We shall, when we come to treat of the idea of being in general, examine these points at length; wherefore we will now pass them by.
ON CHAPTER XXII
(22) We see by a passage from the fourth part of the Discourse on Method, by Descartes, cited in note xv., that besides the principle, I think, therefore I am, he admitted the principle of the legitimacy of evidence; for, asking what is necessary in order that a proposition may be true and certain, he says, that having remarked that if he was certain of the truth of this proposition (I think, therefore I am), he was so only because he saw it to be so; he believed that he could take it to be a general rule that things known clearly and distinctly are all true. This shows two principles, closely connected, although very unlike, to enter into Descartes' system. The first is the fact of consciousness of thought; the second is the general rule of the legitimacy of the criterion of evidence.
It is also to be remarked that there is here some confusion of ideas, which we have already pointed out. It is not exact to say that the principle, I think, therefore I am, is evident: the evidence relates to the consequence; but there is, properly speaking, no evidence of the act of thought, excepting consciousness. Evidence is a criterion, but not the only one.
ON CHAPTER XXIII
(23) What we have said of the second proposition of this chapter is independent of the mode in which the soul and body exercise their mutual influence. These questions belong elsewhere. This influence is, in every system, a fact attested by experience; and this is all that is needed for what we propose to establish here.
ON CHAPTER XXIV
(24) For the better understanding of what we have said in this chapter on evidence, it will be well to consider what will be advanced in chapters XXVI. to XXXI., inclusive.
ON CHAPTER XXV
(25) What has been said in this chapter shows the truth of what we said in the twenty-fourth chapter, upon the connection of the different criteria, and the necessity of not confining one's self to an exclusive philosophy. Consciousness serves as the basis of the other criteria, as an indispensable fact; but if we deny the others, we also deny consciousness.
ON CHAPTERS XXVI., XXVII., AND XXVIII
(26) Dugald Stewart in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, (P. II., C. II., Section 3, § 2,) cites a passage from a dissertation printed at Berlin in 1764, which does not appear so unreasonable as he pretends. We subjoin it, because the German philosopher's opinion seems to us the same that we gave in the text.
"Omnes mathematicorum propositiones sunt identicæ et representantur hac formula, A=A. Sunt veritates identicæ, sub varia forma expressæ, imo ipsum quod dicitur contradictionis principium vario modo enuntiatum et involutum; si quidem omnes hujus generis propositiones revera in eo continentur. Secundum nostram autem intelligendi facultatem ea est propositionum differentia, quod quædam longa ratiociniorum serie, alia autem breviore via, ad primum omnium principiorum reducantur, et in illud resolvantur. Sic. v. g. propositio 2+2=4 statim huc cedit: 1+1+1+1=1+1+1+1; id est, idem est idem; et, proprie loquendo, hoc modo enuntiari debet, – si contingat adesse vel existere quatuor entia, tum existunt quatuor entia; nam de existentia non agunt geometræ, sed ea hypothetice tantum subintelligitur. Inde summa oritur certitudo ratiocinia perspicienti; observat nempe idearum identitatem; et hæc est evidentia assensum immediate cogens, quam mathematicam aut geometricam vocamus. Mathesi tamen sua natura priva non est et propria; oritur etenim ex identitatis perceptione, quæ locum habere potest, etiamsi ideæ non repræsentent extensum."
ON CHAPTERS XXX AND XXXI
(27) We have shown that Dugald Stewart had perhaps in view Vico's doctrine; but without wishing to bring against him the charge he brought against his master, Reid, that of resuscitating the doctrines of the Jesuit Buffier, we would, in order that the reader may judge with full knowledge of the cause, subjoin a remarkable extract from the Scotch philosopher, which will show coincidence between some of his doctrines and those of the Neapolitan. Had Stewart read Vico, we are inclined to believe that he would not have complained of the confusion with which various ancient and modern authors have explained this doctrine.
"The peculiarity of that species of evidence which is called demonstrative, and which so remarkably distinguishes our mathematical conclusions from those to which we are led in other branches of science, is a fact which must have arrested the attention of every person who possesses the slightest acquaintance with the elements of geometry. And yet, I am doubtful if a satisfactory account has hitherto been given of the circumstance in which it arises. Mr. Locke tells us, that 'what constitutes a demonstration is intuitive evidence of every step;' and I readily grant, that if in a single step such evidence should fail, the other parts of the demonstration would be of no value. It does not, however, seem to me that it is on this consideration that the demonstrative evidence of the conclusion depends, not even when we add to it another which is much insisted on by Dr. Reid, – that 'in demonstrative evidence our first principles must be intuitively certain.' The inaccuracy of this remark I formerly pointed out when treating of the evidence of axioms; on which occasion I also observed, that the first principles of our reasonings in mathematics are not axioms, but definitions. It is in this last circumstance (I mean the peculiarity of reasoning from definitions) that the true theory of mathematical demonstration is to be found; and I shall accordingly endeavor to explain it at considerable length, and to state some of the more important consequences to which it leads.
"That I may not, however, have the appearance of claiming, in behalf of the following discussion, an undue share of originality, it is necessary for me to remark that the leading idea which it contains has been repeatedly started, and even to a certain length prosecuted, by different writers, ancient as well as modern; but that, in all of them, it has been so blended with collateral considerations, although foreign to the point in question, as to divert the attention both of writer and reader, from that single principle on which the solution of the problem hinges. * * * * * * *
"It was already remarked, in the first chapter of this part, that whereas, in all other sciences, the propositions which we attempt to establish, express facts real or supposed, – in mathematics, the propositions which we demonstrate only assert a connection between certain suppositions and certain consequences. Our reasonings, therefore, in mathematics, are directed to an object essentially different from what we have in view, in any other employment of our intellectual faculties; – not to ascertain truths with respect to actual existences, but to trace the logical filiation of consequences which follow from an assumed hypothesis. If, from this hypothesis, we reason with correctness, nothing, it is manifest, can be wanting to complete the evidence of the result; as this result only asserts a necessary connection between the supposition and the conclusion. In the other sciences, admitting that every ambiguity of language were removed, and that every step of our deductions were rigorously accurate, our conclusions would still be attended with more or less of uncertainty, being ultimately founded on principles which may, or may not, correspond exactly with the fact." (Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. P. II., C. II., S. 3, § 1.)
This is exactly Vico's doctrine of the cause of the difference in the degrees of evidence and certainty; although he makes a general system, in order to explain the problem of intelligence, what the Scotchman only assigns as a fact to show the reason of mathematical evidence. Père Buffier (Trait. des prem. Vérités, P. I., C. II.) explains the same thing with great clearness.
We have said that, considering the indefatigable laboriousness which distinguishes the Germans, it would not be strange if they had read the scholastics. In confirmation of this, we notice that Leibnitz urgently recommends the reading of them, and the more modern Germans are not likely to forget the advice of so able an author.
Among various passages of Leibnitz, we select the following extract, because it seems to us rather curious: "Truth is more spread than one would believe; but it is often colored, also often covered over, and even weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions which spoil it, or render it less useful. By observing the traces of truth in the ancients, or, to speak more generally, in all who have preceded us, we dig gold from dirt, and draw the diamond from its mine, light from darkness, and this would really be perennis quædam Philosophia.
"It may even be said that some progress would be observable in knowledge. The Orientals have great and beautiful ideas of the Divinity; the Greeks added reasoning and a form of science; the Fathers of the Church rejected whatever was bad in Greek philosophy; but the scholastics labored to usefully employ whatever was acceptable in Pagan philosophy. I have frequently said: aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico barbariei, and I wish we could find some one versed in the Irish and Spanish philosophy, to cull from it what is good; I am sure he would find his labor repaid by many and beautiful truths. There was once a Swiss who mathematized scholastically; his works are but little known; although, from what I have seen of them, I should judge them to be profound and worthy of consideration." (Lettre 3ieme à M. Remond de Montmort.)
Thus speaks Leibnitz, one of the most eminent men of modern times, and of whom Fontenelle said: "He led the van in all the sciences." See, then, if he was wrong in recommending the study of those authors to all desirous of acquiring a profound knowledge of philosophy. This study, setting aside its intrinsic utility, is of great advantage in judging, with knowledge of the cause, a school, which, whatever its worth, occupies a page in the history of the human mind.
